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On 24 February 1344, the Councils of the People and Commune of Florence, at the instance of the 
Signoria and the colleges, enacted a measure (provvisione) awarding Arriguccio di Lotto Pegolotti a 
valuable immunity and privilege. Arriguccio, his sons, and their male descendants were granted a 
permanent exemption, with the exception of indirect taxes (gabelle), from all communal imposts 
and forced loans (prestanze). Arriguccio’s petition for the exemption was granted in recognition of 
the “genuine love that Arriguccio has always had, and has, for the people and commune of 
Florence”. More specifically, the privilege recognized his service to the commune during its 
negotiations with Mastino and Alberto della Scala, lords of Verona, for the purchase of Lucca1. In 
1335 Mastino and Alberto had acquired Lucca from the lords of Parma, the Rossi. Since rule over 
distant Lucca proved unworkable, the Della Scala were eventually forced to put Lucca on the 
market. Pisa had long wanted to acquire Lucca, but its offer was rejected2. Lucca, along with 
Pietrasanta and Barga, was sold to Florence in August 1341 for a price of 250, 000 florins3. After 
further, protracted negotiations, the price was subsequently reduced to 65, 000 florins4. 
Meanwhile, Pisa and Florence went to war over Lucca, with Pisa prevailing and taking control of 
the city in July 13425.  
Arriguccio, formerly of Guelf Florence, but now residing in Verona, was appointed by the Della 
Scala in 1341 as their representative (sindaco) in the initial negotiations with Florence6. Why 
Arriguccio was in Verona is not clear. In describing the negotiations between Florence and Della 
Scala, Giovanni Villani referred to Arriguccio as “nostro antico cittadino ghibellino”7, which suggests 
that he had been exiled and had found safe haven in Ghibelline Verona. In any case, by 1342, 
Arriguccio was no longer mentioned as Della Scala’s representative, but it would be misleading to 
say that he had cast his lot with Florence, which had rewarded him a permanent tax exemption. In 
fact, the legal enforceability of the tax exemption, as we shall see, was originally based on a 
unilateral promise made to the Della Scala by the Signoria of its willingness to grant Arriguccio a 
tax exemption in the future. Arriguccio was apparently trusted by both the Della Scala and 
Florence to act as an honest broker. In Florence’s eyes, his meritorious service lay in facilitating the 
                                                 
* I am indebted to Osvaldo Cavallar, Lawrin Armstrong, and Susanne Lepsius for their valuable comments on 
both the paper and consilum edited in the Appendix, below. I also want to acknowledge the generosity of 
Vincenzo Colli for sending me materials unavailable in Chicago. At last I am able to thank P. Antonio García y 
García, who over thirty years ago kindly made it possible for me to acquire from the Collegio di Spagna, Bologna, 
a microfilm copy of one of the manuscripts used in editing the consilium to which my paper is devoted. The 
following abbreviations have been employed: ASF (Archivio di Stato di Firenze), BAV (Biblioteca Apostolica 
Vaticana), CP (Consulte e Pratiche), PR (Registri delle Provvisioni). Angle brackets (< >) have been used to 
indicate my additions to quoted texts. In the interest of readability, all dates between January 1 and March 25 in 
the text are modernized; to avoid confusion, however, all dates in the footnotes are given according to both 
modern and Florentine conventions.  
1 ASF, PR, 32 (24 Feb. 1343/44), f. 130r; and in the Appendix, below.  
2 For Lucca under the rule of Mastino della Scala, see L. GREEN, Lucca under Many Masters: A Fourteenth-
Century Italian Commune in Crisis (1328-1342), Florence 1995, pp. 77-124.  
3 For the sale of Lucca and the ensuing negotiations, see G. VILLANI, Nuova Cronica, ed. G. PORTA, Parma 1990-
1991, Vol. 3, pp. 249-268 (XII, CXXX-CXXXIV).  
4 I capitoli del Comune di Firenze, inventario e regesto , ed. C. GUASTI, Florence 1993, Vol. 2, pp. 280-296. 
5 GREEN, Lucca under Many Masters, cit., pp. 125ff; C. MEEK, The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-
1369, Cambridge Mass. 1980 (Speculum Anniversary Monographs, 6); M. LUZZATI, Firenze e la Toscana nel 
medioevo. Seicento anni per la costruzione di uno Stato , Turin 1986, pp. 95-96.  
6 See the enactment cited in note 1, and I capitoli, cit., pp. 285-286 (documents dating from September and 
October 1341). See also L. FUMI, Regesti del R. Archivio di Stato in Lucca, Lucca 1903, Vol. 2, p. 18. 
7 G. VILLANI, Nuova Cronica, cit., Vol. 3, p. 262 ( XII, CXXXIII, 91-92).  
 negotiations between the two parties, in showing regard for the hostage-sureties Florence sent to 
Verona during the negotiations, and in assisting Florence in other ways. In February 1344, when 
Florence fulfilled its original promise, Arriguccio had returned to his native city and was residing in 
the parish of Santa Felicita.  
The privilege was honored by the commune until 1359, when a forced loan of 100 florins was 
imposed on Iacopo, the sole surviving son of Arriguccio, who had since died8. The loan had been 
levied by an extraordinary executive commission (Balìa) of sixteen citizens created by the 
legislative councils at the Signoria’s instance in December 1358. At the time, the commune was 
facing war with the troops led by the German mercenary, conte Lando9. The Balìa was granted 
plenary emergency powers to raise 50, 000 florins from citizens through forced loans10. Such ad 
hoc fiscal commissions became permanent fixtures in Trecento Florence11. If the powers of Balìe 
exceeded those of the commune’s regular fiscal officials, they were hardly absolute. In practice, the 
tenure of Balìe was six months and their powers were specifically delimited. The Balìa of 1358, for 
instance, was prohibited from annulling the condemnations and fines imposed on banished rebels, 
favoring any fugitive, interfering with the election of communal officials, encroaching on the 
jurisdiction of other officials, violating the Ordinances of Justice of 1293-1295, granting tax 
immunities and exemptions, and conferring citizenship on foreigners12. The limitations imposed on 
the Balìa’s competency were standard13.  
Citing the privilege granted his father, Iacopo claimed that he was exempt from the forced loan that 
was imposed on him. In turn, the commune’s position was that he must pay the loan in view of the 
powers and balìa vested in the sixteen officials by the Councils of the People and Commune. The 
Balìa acknowledged that unilateral executive action would not resolve the legal questions raised by 
the dispute. While the Balìa did not want to perpetrate an injustice, it also wanted to uphold its 
rightful prerogatives (ius). It therefore commissioned five jurists (Nicola Lapi, Luigi di Neri di Tello 
Gianfigliazzi, Francesco di Lotto Salviati, Francesco di Bici Albergotti, and Baldo di Francesco degli 
Ubaldi) to prepare a consilium sapientis — a formal legal opinion (Appendix, below) that would 
contribute to an impartial resolution of the dispute.  
 
Sapientes Communis 
The submission of the case to the city’s jurists conformed to a wider pattern of formal conflict 
resolution and in northern and central Italy 14. A recurring motif in Florence was that legal matters, 
                                                 
8 See Appendix, below. 
9 On the threat of war with conte Lando, see G. BRUCKER, Florentine Politics and Society, 1348-1378, Princeton 
1962, pp. 176ff.  
10 ASF, PR, 46 (11 Dec. 1358), ff. 71r-72r.  
11 A working definition of the term, balìa , is given by G. PRUNAI, Firenze , Milan 1967 (Acta Italica, 6), p. 50: 
“Balìe: nei casi di necessità o nei momenti difficili per la vita della Repubblica, tutti i poteri dei vari uffici e 
consigli, compresi, spesse volte, anche quelli della Signoria, venivano delegati a speciali commissioni e 
concentrati in una balìa temporanea. Questo termine aveva un doppio significato, indicava l’ufficio in cui 
venivano concentrati e a cui venivano delegati i poteri e, insieme l’autorità e la competenza, di cui tale ufficio 
era stato investito”. A comprehensive study of Florentine Balìe  would be valuable. For now, one may consult: B. 
BARBADORO, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina. Imposta diretta e debito pubblico fino all’istituzione del 
Monte, Florence 1929, esp. pp. 123ff, 267, 572, 593; A. MOLHO, The Florentine Oligarchy and the Balie of the 
Late Trecento , in “Speculum”, 43 (1968), pp. 23-51; N. RUBINSTEIN, The Government of Florence under the 
Medici (1434-94),  2nd ed., Oxford-New York 1997; J. M. NAJEMY, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine 
Electoral Politics, 1280-1400, Chapel Hill 1982, esp. 79ff. For Siena, see the detailed study of G. CECCHINI, 
Archivio di Balìa , Rome 1957(Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, 26).  
12 See the enactment cited above, note 10.  
13 For other examples of the limited powers of special fiscal Balìe, see ASF, PR, 50, f. 55r (1 Dec. 1362); PR, 60, f. 
10 (1 Apr. 1360); PR, 62, f. 175v (20 Oct. 1374); PR, 64, f. 264r (6 Mar. 1376/77). 
14 For the latest overview and bibliography, see M. ASCHERI , Le fonti e la flessibilità del diritto comune: il 
paradosso del ‘consilium sapientis’, in Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, edd. M. ASCHERI, I. 
BAUMGÄRTNER, and J. KIRSHNER, Berkeley 1999 (Studies in Comparative Legal History of The Robbins 
Collection in Religious and Civil Law), pp.11-54. For Florence, see J. KIRSHNER, Consilia as Authority in Late 
Medieval Italy: The Case of Florence, in Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, cit., pp. 107 -140; T. 
KUEHN, Il diritto di famiglia e l’uso del diritto nelle famiglie fiorentine nel Rinascimento , in Palazzo Strozzi metà 
 especially those concerning the legality of executive acts, were better left to the dispassionate 
professional judgment of jurists rather than to the partisanship and emotions (passiones) of 
ordinary citizens15. This refrain expressed the Stoic-Christian perspective that the 
maladministration of justice emanates from destructive private passions of citizens competing for 
wealth, prestige, and privilege16. Armed with technical learning and authority-conferring university 
doctorates and imbued with a professional ethos that gave primacy to conscientious deliberation 
and law’s transpersonal rules, jurists were called on to determine whether public officials were 
complying with the laws binding them in the exercise of their powers. The role of Florentine jurists 
in resolving legal disputes between the commune and persons (citizens, resident aliens, contadini, 
and foreigners) and corporate entities (guilds, ecclesiastical institutions, and subject communities) 
increased exponentially with the creation of the office of the sapientes communis or savi del 
comune in the 1350s. The new compilation of statuti (1355) provided that the Signoria might elect 
two jurists (iudices, sapientes, advocati) with responsibility for advising communal officials, “who 
were in need of consultors and jurists (qui consiliariis seu sapientibus indigerent )”, on the legality 
of executive actions17. Only citizens of Florence and Guelfs in good standing could be appointed as 
sapientes communis, and once appointed, their tenure was limited to two months.  
The office was not immediately staffed, which perhaps explains why an enactment of 1357 ordered 
Florentine jurists to respond to requests for consilia from foreign magistrates (podestà, capitano 
del popolo) or any communal officials. Private persons or entities (universitates) carrying on a 
lawsuit against other private parties in Florence’s courts were also entitled to request a consilium 
sapientis. Jurists were obliged to submit their consilia to the requesting party in appropriate 
written form and according to the schedule established by the statuti of 135518. The sapientes 
                                                                                                                                                                                
millennio 1489-1989. Atti del convegno di studi, Firenze, 3-6 luglio 1989, Rome 1991, pp. 108-125; L. 
MARTINES, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence, Princeton 1968. For an illuminating analysis of the 
reliance of Roman senators on consilia as a strategy of institutional self-legitimization, see I. BAUMGÄRTNER, 
Rat bei der Rechtsprechung. Die Anfänge der juristischen Gutachterpraxis zwischen römischer Kommune und 
päpstlicher Kurie im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert, in Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, cit., 
pp. 55-106.  
15 See note 118, below, and the remark of Filippo Giamori, in a specially summoned meeting to advise the 
Signoria, on requesting the opinion of jurists concerning whether a certain act (commissio ) performed by 
Florence v iolated the terms of a “contractus pacis factus” with the strategically situated city, Sarzana. ASF, CP, 9, 
f. 39v (31 Jan. 1367/68): “Et facta commissio, videatur per sapientes iuris. Placeret mihi quod essent potius 
<sapientes> quam (potius facturi ? quam Cod) cives propter passiones quas cives habent”. Among the five 
jurists who rendered the opinion were Francesco Albergotti and Luigi Gianfigliazzi; see ibid, f. 44r (8. Feb. 
1367/68). On the necessity of making executive decisions on grounds of public utility rather than private 
passions, see D. DE ROSA, Coluccio Salutati: Il Cancelliere e il pensatore poltico, Florence 1980, p. 166.  
16 On the relationship between destructive private passions and the maladministration of justice and misrule, a 
Christian-Stoic-humanist theme, see Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachen Ethics, V. II n. 10 
[1009], trans. C. Litzinger, Notre Dame Indiana, pp. 321-322; P. BRACCIOLINI, De laude Venetiarum, in Opera 
omnia, ed. R. FUBINI, Turin 1964-1969, Vol. 2, pp. 925-937; F. GUICCIARDINI, Dialogo e discorsi del 
Reggimento di Firenze , ed. R. PALMAROCCHI, in Opere , Vol. 7, Bari 1932 (Scrittori d’Italia, 140), pp. 55, 57;N. 
MACHIAVELLI, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio , ed. S. BERTELLI, Milan 1960, III, 35, p. 482 For an 
alternative position, that in seeking justice administrators and judges may properly base their decisions on 
passiones, see A. M. HESPHNA (with the collaboration of A. SERRANO), La senda amorosa del derecho. ‘Amor’ y 
‘iustitia’ en el discurso jurídico modern, in Passiones del jurista: Amor, memoria, melancolía, imaginación, ed. 
C. Petit, Madrid 1997, pp. 25-56. I agree with the authors’ contention that negotiation, local habits, and the 
ruler’s love, rather than formal commands issued by central authorities, characterized the interrelationship of 
political power and law in early modern states. For a positive assessment of the emotional bases of contemporary 
lawmaking and judicial administration, see the first-rate contributions toThe Passions of Law , ed. S. A. BANDES, 
New York 1999. 
17 ASF, Statuti (Podestà), 10, lib. 2, ff. 68v-69r (rub: De advocatis gubernatorum gabellorum et aliorum 
offitialium civium eligendis). 
18 ASF, PR, 44, ff. 51r-52r (16 Jan. 1356/57): “quod omnes et singuli iudices, legiste seu cives florentini, cui seu 
quibus vel in quos aliqua questio seu punctus alicuius questionis, litis, controversiis, dubii sue cause commissus 
fuerit consulendum, sive qui electi fuerint ad consulendum super aliqua questione, lite, controversia, sive 
dubio, per aliquem rectorem sue offitialem comunis Florentie, seu per aliquem seu aliquas personas sive 
universitates, invicem litigantes coram aliquo rectore sue offitiale comunis predicti, teneantur et debeant sub 
 communis came to the fore again in 1358, when the Signoria was charged with electing two jurists 
to the bimestrial office. In the new enactment, tenure was again limited to two months, electoral 
procedures were now detailed, and only those jurists possessing native citizenship (cives originarii) 
would qualify for this office19. The office of the sapientes communis was thereafter continually 
staffed from 1359 until 1449, when it was suppressed by the Medici regime20.  
To avoid anachronism, recall that in this period citizens whose privileges, immunities, and civic 
liberties were actually violated by the public acts of executive and administrative officials could not 
directly seek relief in any of Florence’s courts. True, citizens could lodge complaints against foreign 
magistrates and their entourages for malfeasance and irregularities. Upon leaving office, these 
magistrates were compelled to submit to an investigation conducted by syndics of their official 
activities21. Yet it cannot be emphasized too strongly that constitutionalism and the separation of 
powers, a discrete body of administrative law, special administrative courts, judicial review of 
administrative acts, all fundamental institutions of the Italian legal system today, had not yet been 
conceived, let alone introduced, in the Trecento22. Iacopo di Arriguccio and countless other 
aggrieved Florentines had but one recourse: to ask for relief from the public officials directly 
responsible for the acts in question or from a hierarchical superior, the Signoria23.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
pena trecentarum librarum florenorum parvorum cuilibet ipsorum hec non servanti auferendo summarie et de 
plano per quemcumque rectorem et offitialem dicti populi et comunis, commissionem et electionem ipsam 
acceptare, et sive acceptet sive non, perinde ac si acceptasset habeatur. Et super puncto sibi commisso 
consulere et consilium suum in scriptis dare offitiali qui talem fecerit seu coram quo talis questio seu 
controversia vel dubium ventilabitur seu esset, infra terminum per ipsusm talem rectorem seu offitialem 
statuendum seu prorogandum semel vel pluries, dummodo ipse terminos sive termini non possint excedere 
terminos contentos in statutis comunis Florentie disponentibus de predictis”.  
19 ASF, PR, 46, f. 24r (12 Sept. 1358). 
20 J. KIRSHNER, Consilia as Authority in Late Medieval Italy, cit., p. 137.  
21 See. G. MASI, Il sindicato delle magistrature comunali nel. sec. XIV, in “Rivista italiana per le scienze 
giuridiche”, Vol. 1/2 (1930), pp. 43-115, 331 -411; V. CRECENZI , Il sindicato degli ufficiali nei comuni medievali 
italiani, in L’educazione giuridica, IV: Il pubblico funzionario: modelli storici e comparativi, Vol. 1, Rimini 
1981, pp. 383 -529. On public corruption in Florence, see A. Zorzi, I Fiorentini e gli uffici pubblici nel primo 
quattrocento: Concorrenza, abusi, illegalità, in “Quaderni storici”, 66 (1987), pp. 725-751.   
22 G. CIANFERROTTI, Pandettistica, formalismo e principio di legalità. Ranelletti e la costruzione dell’atto 
amministrativo, in Scritti di storia del diritto offerti del diritto offerti dagli allievi a Domenico Maffei, ed. M. 
ASCHERI, Padua 1991, pp. 509-550. E. CANNADA BARTOLI, ‘Vanum disputare de potestate’, in “Diritto 
processuale amministrativo”, 7 (1991), pp. 155-193 dates the birth of administrative law in Italy to the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Dissenting, L. MANNORI argues convincingly that an administrative law regulating 
legal relationships between center and periphery in the Italian regional states crystallized in the sixteenth 
century. See MANNORI’s Per una ‘preistoria’ della funzione amministrative. Cultura giuridica e attività dei 
pubblici apparati nell’età del tardo diritto comune , in “Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico 
moderno”, 19 (1990), pp. 323-505, and his Il sovrano tutore. Pluralismo e accentramento amministrativo nel 
principato dei Medici (secc. XVI-XVIII), Florence 1994. See also A. RIGAUDIÈRE, Etat, pouvoir et 
administration dans la ‘Pratica aurea libellorum’ de Pierre Jacobi (vers 1311), in Droits savants et pratiques 
Français du pouvoir (XI e-XV e siècles), edd. J. KRYNEN and A. RIGAUDIÈRE, Bordeaux 1992, pp. 161-210, who 
argues for a precocious conception of administrative law developed by the southern French jurist, Pierre Jacobi. 
On public administration in the Midi in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, see the suggestive article 
by M. LESNE-FERRET, Les fondements du pouvoir legislatif et statutaire dans les seigneuries meridionales, in 
Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et genèse de l’Etat, edd. A. GOURON and A. RIGAUDIÈRE, Montpellier 1988 
(Publications de la Societé d’ Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciennes Pays de Droit Ecrit), pp. 145-154. 
However, I would counter that it was not until the eighteenth century, with Montesquieu’s ideas on the 
separation of powers in De l’esprit des lois, that executive functions began to be conceptualized separately from 
judicial institutions and procedures. Separate administrative courts, following the French model, were 
introduced in Italy only in 1971.  
23 That the priors of Perugia and the chief magistrates of Tuscan cities, such as the Signoria in Florence, may serve 
as a court of appeal in the absence of a iudex appellationis was endorsed by both Bartolo (according to Baldo) 
and Baldo himself. See BARTOLUS ad D. 26. 5. 19, Ubi absunt, cit., f. 58r: “Nota diligenter istum casum et sic in 
civitatibus ubi non est iudex appellationis posset appellari a sententiis potestatis ad ordinem decurionem”. For 
Baldo’s explicit statement, see J. CANNING, The Political thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, Cambridge 1987, pp. 
204-205. 
 It appears that citizens and entities were not authorized by statute to request a consilium sapientis 
for the purpose of settling their disputes with communal officials. Initiative lay with the public 
officials who, from 1359 on, routinely submitted disputes with citizens and inhabitants of the 
Florentine territory to the sapientes communis. In accordance with judicial practice and municipal 
law, a consilium sapientis requested by a judge or litigants in a civil law dispute before a judge was 
binding in that it determined the judicial decision24, whereas a consilium sapientis was not de iure 
binding on the requesting officials. Admittedly, a consilium requested by a public official carried 
persuasive authority; in practice, it was not easily ignored or circumvented. The sapientes had the 
advisory authority to declare an executive act unlawful, but their consilia had no instrumental 
power to reverse or modify an executive act. In effect, it was always left to the officials themselves 
or to the Signoria to grant complainants redress25.  
 
Statutory Interpretation 
Jurists defended the prerogative of cities and towns to enact self-governing laws (statuti, 
provvisioni, riformagioni) and were regularly asked to assist in revising statutory compilations26. 
The preamble to the Florentine statuti of 1355 explained that the new compilation was made in 
recognition of the difficulty in applying the city’s statuta, reformationes, provisiones, and 
ordinamenata, which were plagued by superfluities, contradictions, and vague language27. In 
retrospect, the efforts of the committee selected to revise the statuti were valiant but largely 
unrealized. The chronic deficiencies of Florentine municipal law persisted. First of all, the 1355 
statuti were honeycombed with verbal inconsistencies made worse by the obscure and 
contradictory intentions of legislators. Second, because of gaps (casus omissi) in the statuti, whole 
areas of legal relations remained unregulated by municipal law28. Third, the fact that one provision 
was obsoleted by a subsequent provision made the priority of competing municipal laws a recurring 
                                                 
24 In general: W. ENGELMANN, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien durch die wissenschaftliche Lehre , 
Leipzig 1938, pp. 316-328; G. ROSSI, Consilium sapientis iudiciale , Milan 1958. In Florence: ASF, Statuti 
(Podestà), 18, Lib. 2, (rub. 44: De petitione consilii sapientis), f. 155v: “teneatur et debeat dominus potestas et 
eius iudex, et quilibet alius offitialis dicte civitatis coram quo vel quibus questio verteretur, commictere in 
sapientem ipsam causam vel articulum, recepto suspecto aperto si dare voluerit, et secundum consilium 
sapientis super ipsa causa et articulo procedere, et non aliter, et quod contra fecerit non valeat ipso iure”.  
25 For comparable practices in early sixteenth-century Nürnburg, see H. G. WALTHER, Die Rezeption Paduaner 
Rechtswissenschaft durch die Aufnahme Paduaner Konsilien in die Nürnberger Ratschlagbücher, in Consilia im 
späten Mittelalter. Zum historischen Aussagewert einer Quellengattung, ed. I. BAUMGÄRTNER, Sigmaringen 
1995, pp. 207 -224.  
26 U. SANTARELLI, La gerarchia delle fonti secondo gli statuti emiliani e romagnoli, in “Rivista di storia del diritto 
italiano”, 33 (1960), pp. 49-166; D. QUAGLIONI, Legislazione statutaria e dottrina della legislazione; le 
‘Quaestiones Statutorum’di Alberico da Rosciate, in his ‘Civilis Sapientia.’ Dottrine giuridiche e dottrine 
politiche fra medioevo ed età moderna , Rimini 1989; C. STORTI STORCHI, Appunti in tema di ‘potestas condendi 
statuta’, in Statuti città territori in Italia e Germania, edd. G. CHI TTOLINI and D. WILLOWEIT, Bologna 1991  
(Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico, 30), pp. 319-343.  
27 ASF, Statuti (Podestà), 18, lib. 1, f. 82r. Such complaints about the deficiencies of Florentine laws had been 
voiced from the late thirteenth century onward. See N. OTTOKAR, Studi comunali e fiorentini, Florence 1948, p. 
149. Similar problems existed in Siena, on which see M. ASCHERI, Statuti, legislazione e sovranità: il caso di 
Siena, in Statuti città territori in Italia e Germania, cit., pp. 145-194. The redactors of the Bolognese statuti of 
1288 had to examine more than 250 volumes of prior statuti and legislation, as well as all the treaties, privileges, 
and grants of citizenship from 1250 on. See Statuti di Bologna dell’anno 1288, edd. G. FASOLI and P. SELLA, Città 
del Vaticano 1937, Vol. 1, p. viii. 
28 For instance, because the statuti of this period ignored disinheritance, jurists were forced to resolve 
disinheritance cases in accordance with ius commune  rules. See J. KIRSHNER, Baldus de Ubaldis on 
Disinheritance: Contexts, Controversies, Consilia, in “Ius Commune. Zeitschrift für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte”, 27 (2000), pp. 118-214. Another lacuna relating to bona fides and praescriptio  in the 
Florentine statutes is analyzed by T. KUEHN, Conflicting Conceptions of property in Quattrocento Florence: A 
Dispute over Ownership in 1425-26, in his Law Family and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of 
Renaissance Italy, Chicago 1991, pp. 102-126. See also G. Bonolis, Questioni di diritto internazionale in alcuni 
consigli inediti di Baldo degli Ubaldi, testo e commento , Pisa 1908.  
 issue29. Fourth, many statutes and provisions simply fell unnoticed into desuetude. Fifth, municipal 
laws were in a perpetual state of potential conflict with the ius commune, essentially the Corpus 
iuris of Justinian and its Glossa ordinaria, but also the general law encompassing the vast body of 
romano-canonical rules and practices and their accompanying jurisprudence.  
These were among the core problems addressed by jurists in questiones and in the tracts dedicated 
to statutory questions compiled by Alberto Gandino and Alberico da Rosciate30. Gandino had 
recommended that statuta muncipalia should be revised annually, unless the statuta contain a 
specific clause excluding annual revision. Alberico stated that it was common for legislators to limit 
the validity of legislation to one year. But following the teachings of Dino del Mugello, he argued 
that in theory statuta are valid in perpetuity just as its author, the people, endures in perpetuity31. 
Bartolo da Sassoferrato concurred32. If a few towns (e.g., Viterbo, Spoleto, Foligno) practiced an 
attenuated form of annual revision, most towns did not because it was manifestly impractical. This 
was especially the case in Florence, where, with its massive legislative corpus, annual readoption 
and revision would have paralyzed not just the legal system but also daily political life. Telling is the 
preambular language of a Florentine provision of December 1394 lamenting that it was forty years 
since the statuti of 1355 and riformagioni and provvisioni had been vetted. “In many parts and 
places, some statutes are mutually contradictory, some are corrected by others and many are 
superfluous, while still others are obscure and perplexing in arrangement, and there is so much 
confusion in them that they can no longer be understood, nor thoroughly known, nor even 
memorized by the foreign magistrates and their officials, who are in office for a limited time, unless 
the statutes are continuously read by them, so that because of ignorance, changing circumstances, 
and complexities, it often happens that public and private rights are violated and time and again 
many improprieties result”33.  
A remedy for the deficiencies threatening the operability of municipal law was found, as the Glossa 
Neque leges (D. 1. 3. 10) had put it, interpretatione iurisconsulti authoritate34. As the rules of 
statutory interpretation derived from the ius commune itself, the task of interpretation was 
assigned to the jurists, the self-appointed guardians of the ius commune35. The aim of 
interpretation was not to discover the subjective intentions of legislators or the purpose of the 
statute, by investigating the socio-political context in which it was drafted. Rather, interpretation 
was aimed at establishing the proper meaning (ratio) of the statutory text36. In accepting this task, 
Bartolo and the jurists who followed in his footsteps tended to give priority to the ius commune. 
                                                 
29 In the thirteenth century the commune of Siena established the office of the maggior sindico to defend its 
constitutio . According to Bowsky, “he was to attend all sessions of the City Council and there speak against any 
proposals that might derogate from the rights and honor of the commune”. Pragmatic considerations led the 
Council to overrule the maggior sindico “very close to 100% of the time”. See W. BOWSKY, The Constitution and 
Administration of a Tuscan Republic in the Early Middle Ages and Early Renaissance: The ‘Maggior Sindaco’ in 
Siena, in “Studi senesi”, 17 (1968), pp. 7 -22, quotes on p. 9.  
30 C. STORTI STORCHI, Prassi dottrina ed esperienza legislativa nel ‘opus statutorum’ di Alberico da Rosciate, in 
Confluence des droit savants et des pratiques juridiques. Actes du Colloque de Montpellier... 1 2-14 déc. 1979, 
Milan 1979, pp. 437 -489; D. Quaglioni, Legislazione statutaria e dottrina della legislazione , cit.  
31 U. SANTARELLI, Pensiero giuridico e applicazione. Gli strumenti normativi e la loro durata nell’Umbria 
medievale , in Gli statuti comunali umbri, ed. E. MENESTÒ, Spoleto 1997, pp. 26-42.  
32 D. SEGOLONI, L’annalità dagli statuti comunali, in “Bollettino della Deputazione di Storia Patria per l’Umbria”, 
88 (1991), pp. 33-42.  
33 My translation from the text quoted by A. ZORZI, L’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella repubblica 
fiorentina, Florence 1988, p. 12. On the revision of the statuti, see also MARTINES, Lawyers and Statecraft , cit., 
pp. 185ff; and G. GUIDI, Il governo della città-repubblica di Firenze del primo Quattrocento , Florence 1981, Vol. 
1, pp. 59ff.  
34 Cited and discussed by P. GROSSI, L’ordine giuridico medievale, Bari 1995, p. 167.  
35 On statutory interpretation, see CH. LEFEBVRE, Le pouvoirs du juge en droit canonique Paris 1938; M. 
SBRICCOLI, L’interpretazione dello statuto . Contributo allo studio della funzione dei giuristi nell’età comunale , 
Milan 1967; V. CRESCENZI, Problemi dell’interpretatio  nel sistema del diritto comune classico, in “Bulletino 
dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medievo”, 98 (1992), pp. 271-322; W. P. MÜLLER, Signorolus de Homodeis 
and the Medieval Interpretation of Statutory Law , in “Rivista internazionale di diritto comune”, 6 (1995), pp. 
217 -232.  
36 I. MACLEAN, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law , Cambridge 1992, pp. 115ff.  
 According to his pupil, Baldo degli Ubaldi, Bartolo held that “the ius commune shapes and clothes 
statutes but is neither shaped nor clothed by them, and this because of the powerful attraction that 
the ius commune exerts over municipal law, and not the other way around”37. For his part, Baldo 
refused to embrace Bartolo’s view that without the supportive covering of the ius commune 
municipal law stood naked and impotent38.  
Baldo’s theory of statutory interpretation was predicated on the principle of “subsidiarity”, which 
gave wide latitude to municipal law and assigned the ius commune an auxiliary role of assisting 
municipal law when its operability was threatened by obscurity, inapplicability (ubi cessat 
statutum habet locum ius civile) and unprovided-for cases (casus omissus remanet sub 
dispositione iuris communis)39. In numerous consilia he therefore defended the operability of what 
he considered unambiguous municipal laws even when they contradicted the ius commune, while in 
many others he was compelled to give preference to the ius commune40. In addition, Baldo 
sustained appeals to the ius commune in disputes surrounding laws that had been emended, 
modified, or abrogated by new laws41. And he held that a local custom promoting criminal behavior 
may be abrogated by reference to general imperial law42. For Baldo and his fellow jurists, statutory 
interpretation anchored in the ius commune was a way of making the statute speak, of performing 
the law “by deciding its relationship to an individual case”43. As performers of the law, they 
uncompromisingly rejected the idea of a purely autonomous power of legislators and by extension a 
body of municipal law standing independently from higher norms and the authority of juristic 
interpretation. Their unyielding allegiance to the rule of law animated by reason would have 
compelled them to denounce so-called Machiavellian and Guicciardian realism, which supposedly  
severed the “politically effective” from the “normatively valid”44. Likewise, they would have 
                                                 
37 BALDUS ad X 1. 2. 1, Canonum:, Venice 1595, f. 11r, n. 49: “Hoc est dicere quod ius commune informat statuta 
et vestit, sed non informatur nec vestitur ab eis, et hoc propter virtutem attractivam quam habet ius commune 
ad muncipale et non econtra de ista virtute attractiva, no. ff. de pac, l. Iuris gentium, § Quinimo (D. 2. 14. 7. 5)”.  
38On this point see ROSSI, cit., Consilium sapientis iudiciale , p. 97, and SBRICCOLI’s hermeneutic  analysis, 
L’interpretazione dello statuto, cit., pp. 438-442. 
39 U. NICOLINI, Il principio di legalità nelle democrazie italiane. Legislazione e dottrina politico-giuridica 
dell’età comunale , Milan 1947, pp. 285ff; E. BUSSI, Lineamenti di un sistema del diritto comune , Milan 1949, p. 
28. According to N. HORN, Aequitas in den Lehren des Baldus, Cologne-Graz 1968, p. 77, Baldo’s position was 
“Das ius commune hatte mithin nur subsidiäre  Geltung”. See also CANNING, The Political Thought of Baldus de 
Ubaldis, cit., pp. 149ff.  
40 I refrain here from citing dozens of raw, unanalyzed examples from the ca. 3000 consilia that Baldo authored, 
many of which were cited by the sixteenth-century jurist, DOMENICO TOSCHI, in his Practicarum conclusionum 
iuris ... tomus tertius, Lyon 1634, pp. 361 -367, concl. 573 (Statutum debet interpretari secundum ius commune, 
et qualiter, et quando non). For six studies of Baldo’s approach, see: D.  QUAGLIONI, ‘Questione ebraica’ e usura 
in Baldo degli Ubaldi (1327-1400), in ‘Civilis Sapientia,’ cit., pp. 69-192, 229-34; J. PLUSS, Reading Case Law 
Historically: A Consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis on Widows and Dowries, in “American Journal of Legal History”, 
30 (1986), pp. 241 -65; V.  PIERGIOVANNI, Diritto e potere a Genova alla fine del trecento: a proposito di tre 
‘consigli’ di Baldo degli Ubaldi, in La storia dei Genovesi, Genoa 1987, Vol. 7, pp. 40-62; G. P. MASSETTO, Il 
lucro dotale nella dottrina e nella legislazione statuaria lombarda dei secoli XIV-XVI, in AA.VV., Ius mediolani. 
Studi di storia del diritto milanese offerti dagli allievi a Giulio Vismara , Milan 1996, pp. 219-254; J. KIRSHNER, 
Donne maritate altrove. Genere e cittadinanza in Italia, in Tempi e spazi di vita femminile tra medioevo ed età 
moderna, edd. S. SEIDEL MENCHI, A. JACOBSEN SCHUTTE, and T. KUEHN, Bologna 1999, pp. 377-430; O. 
CAVALLAR, La ‘benefundata sapientia’ dei periti: Feritori, feriti e medici nei commentari e consulti di Baldo 
degli Ubaldi, in “Ius Commune. Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte”, 27 (2000), pp. 215-281.  
41 BALDUS, Consilia, Venice 1575, Vol. 3, f. 81v, cons. 365, n. 1 (=BAV, Barb. lat. 1406, f. 61r).  
42 BALDUS ad D. 1. 3. 30, Princeps, Commentaria, Venice 1586, f. 21v, nn. 3 -4.  
43 MACLEAN, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance, cit., p. 177.  
44 A. MOULAKIS, Republican Realism in Renaissance Florence. Francesco Guicciardini’s ‘Discorso di Logrogno ,’ 
Lanham, MD 1998, p. 17. Moulakis either ignores or is unaware that Guicciardini, writing as a jurist, accepted the 
right of a prince or state to expropriate the goods of particular individuals, so long as it was done for the 
“normatively valid” reason of public utility. On Guicciardini’s use of this medieval construct, see O. CAVALLAR, 
Francesco Guicciardini and the ‘Pisan Crisis’: Logic and Discourses, in the “Journal of Modern History”, 65 
(1993), p. 273.  
 denounced as an abomination Carl Schmitt’s norm-less conception of law—namely, that “the 
sovereignty of the law means only the sovereignty of men who draw up and administer the law”45.  
 
Five Consultors 
The five consultors commissioned by the Balìa can be divided into two groups. Lapi, Salviati, and 
Gianfigliazzi were native citizens, active in political and diplomatic affairs, and engaged in the 
internal affairs of their guild46. We do not know at which universities they had earned their 
doctorates. Their reputations as jurists were strictly local and none was called to teach at Florence’s 
university or Studio. The consilium itself was drafted on behalf of the five jurists by Francesco 
Salviati47. He belonged to a wealthy mercantile and politically active family of the first rank and 
served three times as sapiens communis (May/Jun. 1360; Sept./Oct. 1361; Nov./Dec. 1362)48, and 
earlier, in 1342, served as one of the sixteen gonfalonieri di compagnia49. Lapi was the first jurist 
to hold the office of sapiens communis, (Jul./Aug. 1359)50, and it is possible that he was serving in 
that capacity when, around July 1359, the consilium concerning this case (Appendix, below) was 
produced. Altogether he was reappointed sapiens communis six times during the 1360s51. He also 
was appointed to the board of officials who supervised the Studio52, and is found performing 
promissory oaths on behalf of Florence to uphold intercity pacts53. It is likely that Lapi had first-
hand knowledge of Arriguccio Pegolotti’s exploits, for he was kept as a hostage-surety by the Della 
Scala in 1345 pending the outcome of the settlement with Florence over the purchase of Lucca54. 
Lapi’s investments in the city’s public debt suggest that he was wealthy55.  
There no evidence to support Novati’s assertion that Gianfigliazzi, a leading member of an 
illustrious Guelf casa , was elected to the priorate three times (1351, 1357, and 1363)56. His did 
serve as sapiens communis once57, and the advice he tendered in Florence’s executive councils 
(Consulte e Pratiche) as one of the richiesti carried weight58. The commune also relied on his 
                                                 
45 C. SCHMITT, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1976, p.  67. 
46 See, for example, ASF, Arte dei Giudici e Notai, 28, ff. 2r-95v (12 Feb. 1358/59-4 Jan. 1363); ibid., 90, 
unfoliated (year: 1358). 
47 Another consilium written by Salviati is found in BAV, Vat. lat. 8069, f. 333rv.  
48 ASF, Tratte, 188, f. 70r; Tratte 189, f. 53r; Tratte, 210, f. 56r. See also BRUCKER, Florentine Politics, cit.,., 
passim; and P. HURTUBISE, Une famille-temoin. Les Salviati, Città del Vaticano 1985, esp. pp. 28-29, 32-33, 38, 
105.  
49 I capitoli del Comune di Firenze , Vol. 2, p. 297.  
50 ASF, Tratte, 188, f. 6r. Another consilium of Lapi was published with Bartolo’s consilia: see the Venetian edition 
of  1570-71, Vol. 10, II, f. 68rv, cons. 59. Franco Sacchetti included Lapi in his encomium of the most worthy 
citizens of Florence. See his Il libro delle rime, ed. F. BRAMBILLA AGENO, Florence-Perth 1990, p. 380, CCXLIV 
(128-130): “messer Nicola Lapi, che si crede che a la vera ragione si diriz<z>ava, come ch’ancor per la fama 
oggi si vede”. For Domenico Silvestri’s epitaph commemorating Nicola Lapi, see Domenico Silvestri: The Latin 
Poetry , ed R. C. Jensen, Munich 1973, p. 184. 
51 ASF, Tratte, 189, f. 41v (Jul./Aug 1361); Tratte, 210, f. 68r (Jan./Feb 1362/63); Tratte, 212, f. 83r (May/Jun. 
1366); Tratte, 190, f. 40r (Sept./Oct 1366), f. 95v (Jan./Feb. 1367/68); Tratte, 191, f. 62r (May/June 1369). 
52 Statuti della Università e Studio fiorentino dell’anno MCCCXX al MCCCCLXXII, ed. A. GHERARDI, Florence 
1881, pp. 111, 113, 123. For other commissions, see Tratte, 212, f. 54r (29 Dec.1365), f. 101v (27 July 1366); 
Tratte, 213, f. 38r (1 Feb. 1366/67). 
53 I capitoli del Comune di Firenze , cit., Vol. 1, pp. 29, 306, 312, 314, 328; Vol. 2, p. 63. 
54 Ibid., p. 296.  
55 ASF, Monte Comune o delle Graticole, Parte II, n. 779, f. 167r (year: 1370). Among Lapi’s holdings were 
voluntary loans in the Monte dell’un tre  with a face value of 2, 681 florins that paid 15 percent interest per 
annum. For a reference to Gianfigliazzi’s holdings in the Monte dell’un due, see Ibid, n. 804, f. 105v ( Nov. 1374-
Oct.1375). 
56 F. NOVATI, Luigi Gianfigliazzi, giureconsulto ed orator fiorentino del sec. XIV, in “Archivio storico italiano”, 
5 th ser., 3 (1888), pp. 441-447. The lack of evidence has been pointed out in V. Arrighi’s bio -bibliographical 
profile in the Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Rome 2000, Vol., 54, pp. 363-366. Nor does Luigi appear as 
prior in the excellent database, Florentine Renaissance Resources, Online Tratte of Office Holders 
(http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/tratte/). 
57 ASF, Tratte, 210, f. 5r (July /Aug. 1363).  
58 ASF, CP, 4, f. 15r (25 Jan. 1362/63); CP, 5, f. 28v (29 Feb. 1363/64), f. 55r (18 Apr. 1364); CP, 6, f. 24v (26 Nov. 
1364), f. 37v (13 Jan. 1365); CP, 9, f. 7r (1054 Nov. 1367), f. 8r (11 Nov. 1367), f. 16r (12 Dec. 1367), f. 19v (17 
 diplomatic and oratorical skills, most notably in 1367, when he represented Florence in its dealings 
with Pope Urban V, who had recently returned from Avignon to Italy 59. He was steeped in classical 
rhetoric and admired by his literary compatriot, Franco Sacchetti, as an “eloquente legista”60. His 
commentary on Cicero’s De inventione is considered a prime example of early Florentine 
humanism61.  
The second group of jurists included Albergotti and Baldo degli Ubaldi, newcomers to Florence, 
welcomed as distinguished teachers and practitioners. A scion of a Guelf patrician Aretine family, 
Albergotti migrated to Florence where he acquired original Florentine citizenship in January 
135062. He was appointed as sapiens communis six times and taught at the Studio continuously 
from 1357/58 through 1369/7063. Baldo, his colleague at the Studio, parsimonious in praising his 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Dec. 1367), f. 44r (8 Feb. 1367/68), f. 93r (10 May 1368), f. 101v (2 Jun. 1368), f. 107r (6 Jun. 1368), f. 121v (3 
Jul. 1368), f. 127v (19 Jul. 1368), f. 128v (19 Jul. 1368), f. 134r (22 Jul. 1368). Another consilium with 
Gianfigliazzi’s (Luisius de Iamzilacis) subscriptio  is found in Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, MS 83, f. 163r.  
59 NOVATI, Luigi Gianfigliazzi, cit., pp. 441-444; I capitoli del Comune di Firenze , cit., Vol. 1, p. 382. For his 
activities as ambassador to Perugia and Siena and to the congress held at Arezzo in 1351, see G. DEGLI AZZI 
VITELLESCHI , Le relazioni di Firenze e l’ Umbria nel secolo XIV secondo i documenti del R. o Archivio di Stato di 
Firenze , Perugia 1904, doc. 166, 173, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274; D. MARZI, La cancelleria della Repubblica 
fiorentina, Rocca S. Casciano 1910, pp. 697 -698.  
60 Il libro delle rime, cit., p. 379, CCXLIV (109-110).  
61 J. O. WARD, Renaissance Commentators on Ciceronian Rhetoric , in Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the 
Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric , ed. J. J. MURPHY, Berkeley 1983, pp. 136-137; Idem, Ciceronian 
Rhetoric in Treatise, Scholion and Commentary , Turnhout 1995 (Typologie des sources du moyen age 
occidental, 58), pp. 65-66. R. G. WITT, ‘In the Footsteps of the Ancients’: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato 
to Bruni, Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2000 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 74), pp. 363-364, 369, 
428, 443, who mistakenly calls Gianfigliazzi a “Roman lawyer”.  
62 For his career and works, see J. KIRSHNER, Messer Francesco di Bici degli Albergotti d’Arezzo, Citizen of 
Florence (1350-1376), in “Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law”, 2 (1972), pp. 84-90; and J. KIRSHNER and J. PLUSS, 
Two Fourteenth-Century Opinions on Dowries, Paraphernalia and Non-Dotal Goods, in “Bulletin of Medieval 
Canon Law,” 9 (1979), pp. 65-77; A. CAMPITELLI , Il “tractatus de cicatricibus” di Francesco Albergotti 
attribuito a Bartolo da Sassoferrato , in “Annali di storia del diritto”, 8 (1964), pp. 283-88; K. PARK, The Readers 
at the Florentine Studio According to Communal Fiscal Records (1357-1380, 1413-1446), in “Rinascimento”, 21 
(1980), pp. 249-267. For additional copies of Albergotti’s consilia and doctrinal works, see Florence, ASF, 
Corporazioni religiose soppressi dal governo francese, 98, n. 252, ff. 154r-157r  (Disputatio domini Francisci de 
Albergottis de Aretio ); Biblioteca Nazionale, Magl. XXIX, 161, ff. 16v, 98r; Magl. XXIX, 172, ff. 122v, 208v, 
248rv, 342v -343v (De collectis et reportatis domini Francisci de Aretio in rubrica, De secundis nuptiis, C. in l. 
Feminae [C. 5. 9. 3]); Magl. XXIX, 174, ff. 16v-17r;  115-117r; Fondo Nazionale, II, II, 375, f. 64r; Foligno, 
Biblioteca Iacobili del Seminario Diocesano, MS 23 (A VI, 17), ff. 20r-20v, 21v-22r, 23r-24r, 24r-25r, 28v -29v; 
29v -30r; Lucca, Biblioteca Capitolare Felinina, Cod. 351, ff. 278ra-279va; Cod. 419, ff. 190v -192v (with 
subscriptiones of Giovanni da Legnano, Antonio de Presbyteris and others); Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, MS I 
249 Inf., ff. 133r-135r (expl: Et ita nos Thomas de Cursinis et Antonius de Machiavellis, cives Florentini, et 
Francishus de Aretio, iuris doctores consulimus etc ; ff. 135v-137r, 310v -311r, with consilia on the same case by 
Baldo (f. 311r) and Giovanni da Legnano (f. 311rv); Pisa, Biblioteca Universitaria, MS Roncioni 704, ff. 123r, 414r-
418v (repetitio); Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria, Cod. H. I. 13, fols. 86v-87r; BAV, Urb. lat. 1132, f. 
141rv; ANGELO DEGLI UBALDI, Consilia, Lyon 1551, ff. 192r-193v, cons. 349, (inc: Martinus Io. de Florentia ) G. 
DOLEZALEK, Verzeichnis der Handschriften zum römischen Recht bis 1600, Frankfurt am Main 1972, Vol. 3, 
svv. Franciscus de Albergottis, Franciscus Bici de Aretio; and I Codici del Collegio di Spagna di Bologna, ed. D. 
MAFFEI et alii, Milan 1992, p. 915. Another MS, Phillips 8889, contains four Albergotti consilia: f. 113rv (Inc: 
Brevis facti narratio est Martinus Johannis de Florentia decessit), f. 119r (Inc: In puncto premisso non stando), 
ff. 129r-130r (Inc: Statutum cavetur quod potestas), f. 224rv (Inc: In causa potestatis civitatis Florentie , with 
subsriptiones by Giovanni de’ Ricci and Nicola Lapi). This MS dates from the early fifteenth century and contains 
consilia of other Florentine jurists in addition to those of Bartolo, Francesco Tigrini, Baldo, and Angelo degli 
Ubaldi. It was formerly owned by the New York bookseller, H. P. Kraus, who sold it to a German bookseller in the 
early 1980s. The current location of the manuscript is unknown. The above references to Albergotti’s works is by 
no means exhaustive. 
63 ASF, Tratte, 188, f. 50r (Jan./Feb1359/60); Tratte, 213, f. 297 (Jan. /Feb. 1366/67); Tratte, 214, f. 27r 
(Sept./Oct. 1367); Tratte, 191, f. 48v (Mar./Apr. 1368/69); Tratte, 192, f. 63r (Jan./ Feb. 1372/73); Tratte, 219, f. 
46r (May/June 1376); PARK, The Readers at the Florentine Studio , cit., pp. 249-67.  
 contemporaries, called Albergotti “valentissimum doctorem”64. Later jurists considered him a 
disciple of Bartolo and his commentaries as well as his consilia were frequently cited, though most 
of his works remain unedited. 
Baldo was a rising star when he arrived in Florence from Pisa in 1358 at the age of thirty-one to 
teach civil law at the Studio65. With a starting salary of 250 florins, climbing to 300 florins in 1360, 
which were substantial sums at the time, he was among the highest paid professors at the Studio66. 
At this early stage in his career, Baldo could not yet command the astronomical salary of 800 
florins that was awarded in 1362 to the Bolognese jurist, Riccardo da Saliceto67. Like Albergotti and 
other foreign jurists arriving in Florence to practice law and to teach, Baldo was granted original 
citizenship in October 135968. The following month his wife, Lauduzia, gave birth to twin boys “in 
civitate florida Florentinorum”, an event the elated Baldo recorded in his commentary on the lex 
Arboribus (Dig. 7. 1. 12)69. In 1361, Baldo was enrolled in the Guild of Jurists and Notaries, but he 
was not an active member of the guild70. As far as we know, with the exception of his university 
position, Baldo was neither elected nor appointed to public office in Florence71. After teaching six 
years in Florence, Baldo returned to Perugia at the end of 1364 to assume a professorship at his 
alma mater.  
Future research on the manuscript tradition of Baldo’s commentaries may reveal which passages 
possibly incorporate or reflect his lectures in Florence72. For sure, the Tractatus de vi et potestate 
statutorum, edited by Meijers, formed part of a lengthy repetitio that Baldo had dedicated to lex 
Cunctos populos (Cod. 1. 1. 1) at the Studio in November 13587 3. I agree with Meijers’s 
observation that Baldo’s experience in Florence informed his views on the application of communal 
statutes and the limits of communal territorial jurisdiction. Another repetitio, dedicated to lex 
Iusiurandum (D. 12. 2. 2) and delivered at the Studio in 1359, is preserved in the Biblioteca 
Ambrosiana of Milan74. Baldo also penned consilia dealing with disputes occurring in Florence or 
involving Florentines residing elsewhere75. A number of these consilia, however, date from the 
period after he had left Florence.  
From the manuscript collections as well as the printed editions of Baldo’s consilia, it is difficult to 
gauge the extent to which he collaborated with other jurists on the same consilium. There is at 
least one other consilium on which he collaborated with Albergotti, Lapi and Salviati76. He produced 
                                                 
64 BALDUS, Consilia, Brescia 1490, cons. 146, sp; TH. DIPLOVATATIUS, Liber de claris iurisconsultis. Pars 
posterior, edd. F. SCHULZ, H. KANTORWICZ, and S. RABOTTI, in “Studia Gratiana”, 10 (1968), p. 296. 
65 T. CUTURI, Baldo degli Ubaldi in Firenze, in L’opera di Baldo, per cura dell’Università di Perugia nel V 
centenario della morte del grande giureconsulto , ed. O. SCALVANTI, Perugia 1901, pp. 365-395.  
66 PARK, The Readers at the Florentine Studio , cit., pp. 253-257.  
67 Ibid., pp. 256-258.  
68 CUTURI, pp. 366-369.  
69 BALDUS ad Dig. 7. 1. 12, cit., f. 301v. 
70 J. KIRSHNER, Ars imitatur naturam: A Consilium of Baldus on Naturalization in Florence, in “Viator,” 5 
(1974), p. 306.  
71 Baldo took a promissory oath on behalf of Florence in a pact with Volterra. The document is dated 30 August 
1369—that is, after Baldo had left Florence for Perugia where he was then teaching. See I capitoli del Comune di 
Firenze , cit., Vol. 2, p. 329.  
72 For an excellent example of this type of research, see V. COLLI, L’idiografo della Lectura super primo, secundo 
et tertio libro Codicis di Baldo degli Ubaldi, in “Ius commune. Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte”, 29 
(1999), pp. 91-122.  
73 Published in Haarlem 1939. 
74 MS 249 Inf, ff. 356v (Repetitio singularissima l. ii, ff. de iureiurando secundum dominum Baldum compillata in 
civitate Florentie in qua legebat ordinarie in iure civile )-400r (Repetita fuit ista l. ii, ff. de iureiurando per 
utriusque iuris doctorem dominum Baldum de Perusio in civitate Florentie in qua ordinarie ius civile legebat 
1359 et se supposunt correctiones [correctiones ex correctioni corr. Cod.] doctorum collegi Florentini).  
75 Owing to the nettlesome issues of attribution and dating, I abstain here from giving a comprehensive list of the 
consilia Baldo devoted to Florence and Florentines abroad. For a few examples, see Consilia, cit., Vol. 1, f. 132r, 
cons. 408 (=BAV, Barb., lat. 1406, ff. 3r-4v); Vol. 2, ff. 62v-63r, cons., 218 (=BAV, Barb., lat. 1404, ff. 76v -76r); 
Vol. 4, f. 70r, cons. 315 (=BAV, Barb. lat. 1399, f. 130r).  
76 Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, MS 122, ff. 39v-40v. See I Codici del Collegio di Spagna di Bologna, cit., pp. 365-
336, n. 26. For other consilia on which Baldo collaborated with Francesco Albergotti, see J. KIRSHNER and J. 
 consilia in collaboration with his brothers, Angelo and Piero77, distinguished jurists in their own 
right who were also recruited to teach at the Florentine Studio. In Florence, at any rate, consilia 
sapientis were commonly drafted by one jurist and endorsed (subscriptio) by several others. The 
endorsing jurist (subscriptor) attested that he was adopting the lead opinion as his own. Four 
jurists in the case at hand made such endorsements, but Baldo also added that he had affixed his 
endorsement “after having first carefully discussed the opinion with the most outstanding doctor, 
lord Francesco, and the other doctors named above and those endorsing below (whose 
pronouncements and opinions I follow), as the pronouncements of the majority (dicta maiorum) 
are supported by valid reasons (Appendix, below)”. The expression, dicta maiorum, denotes not 
only a numerical majority but also one’s elders, thus signalling Baldo’s respect for his senior 
colleagues.  
Taking Baldo at his word, I shall treat the consilium as a collaborative effort, even though it is was 
drafted by Salviati in first-person discourse. Collaboration plausibly entailed several steps. The 
jurists likely discussed or submitted memos about the points of law that should be covered in the 
consilium. Next, Salviati would have produced a draft that was circulated among his colleagues for 
comments and additions. A final solemn draft would then be produced to which each jurist affixed 
his subscriptio and seal78.  
 
Immunitas and Privilegium 
Two key terms in this dispute, immunitas and privilegium, had technical meanings. Immunitas, in 
the civil law, generally referred to an exemption from public imposts and duties (munera), as in De 
iure immunitatis (D. 50. 6), which was given for a legitimate reason. Although immunitas and 
privilegium were used interchangeably, privilegium carried a wider range of meanings. Broadly 
speaking, privilegium was a legitimate exemption from the ordinary constraints imposed by law, 
whether municipal law or the ius commune. It not only encompassed fiscal exemptions, but also 
special advantages (favores and beneficia) automatically accorded to an indefinite number of 
persons belonging to a qualifying group, such as wives, orphans, physicians, university professors, 
students, veterans, and even rustics79. As a matter of strict law, this type of privilege, known as 
privilegium personae and ius singulare, could neither be transferred by the privileged person to 
another nor transmitted to an heir80. Exceptions aside81, a privilege attached to personal goods and 
usufructory rights was similarly neither transferable nor heritable, while a privilege attached to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
PLUSS, Two Fourteenth-Century Opinions on Dowries, cit.; Chicago, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, 
MS 6, ff. 62va-64vb; Vat. lat. 8069, ff. 176r-177r. For Baldo’s collaboration with Tommaso Corsini (?) on a 
Florentine case of January 1362, for which he received a fee of 3 florins, see C. M. DE LA RONCIÈRE, Un changeur 
florentin du trecento: Lippo di Fede del Sega (1285 env. - 1363 env.), Paris 1973, p. 248.  
77 For Baldo’s collaboration with his brothers, see Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, MS 83, ff. 143v, 330v; MS 126, ff. 
150r, 230v -231r; Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, MS I 249 Inf., ff. 435-440r; BAV, Barb. lat. 1400, ff. 13r-14v; D. 
QUAGLIONI, ‘Civilis sapientia,’ cit., pp. 232-234.  
78 On communicato colloquio , see O. CAVALLAR, Francesco Guicciardini giurista. I ricordi degli onorari, Milan 
1991, pp. 106-1 0 7 ,  1 7 8-179, 228-231.  
79 Roman law: R. ORESTANO, Ius singulare e privilegium in diritto romano , in “Annali della R. Università di 
Macerata”, 11 (1937), pp. 5ff; P. GARNSEY, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire , Oxford 1970; 
H. WEILING, Privilegium exigendi, in “Revue d’histoire de droit”, 56 (1988), pp. 279-298; S. LINK, Konzepte der 
Privilegierung römischer Veteranen, Stuttgart 1989; TH. MAYER-MALY, ‘Rusticitas’, in Studi in onore di Cesare 
Sanfilippo , Milan 1982, Vol. 1, pp. 309-347. For the Middle Ages: V .  PIANO MORTARI, Ius singulare e 
privilegium nel pensiero dei glossatori, in “Rivista italiana per le scienze giuridiche”, 92 (1957/58), pp. 271-350; 
E.  CORTESE, La norma giuridica, Milan 1964, Vol. 2, pp. 52ff (on the difference between privilegium and 
beneficium); A. GOURON, La notion de privilège dans la doctrine juridique du douzième siècle , in Das Privileg im 
europäischen Vergleich, ed. B. DÖLEMAYER and H. MOHNHAUPT, Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 1-16; D. 
LINDNER, Die Lehre vom Privileg nach Gratian und den Glossatoren des Corpus iuris canonici, Regensburg 
1917 ; G. LE BRAS, CH. LEFEBVRE and J. RAMABAUD, L’ âge classique, 1140-1378, Paris 1965 (Histoire du droit 
et des institutions de l’eglise en Occident, 7), pp. 489ff.  
80 BALDUS ad VI 5. 13. 7,  Privilegium, ed. P. LALLY , in Baldus de Ubaldis on the ‘Liber Sextus’ and ‘De Regulis 
Iuris’: Text and Commentary , Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago 1992, Vol. 2, p. 367 : “Privilegium personale 
proprie dicitur id quod finitur cum persona”.  
81 For exceptions, see DINO DEL MUGELLO ad VI 5. 13. 7, Privilegium, De regulis iuris, Lyon 1539, ff. 31r- 32v. 
 real property and to property promised as a pledge was heritable (privilegium reale). In Florence, 
the forced and voluntary loans consolidated into the city’s public debt (Monte Comune), called 
crediti di monte, were treated as privileged property. Although the commune was under no 
obligation to redeem the loans, the credits carried the city’s promise to pay lenders a perpetual 
interest and an immunity against confiscation, except in cases of bankruptcy. Further, the credits 
could be sold to third parties, used as collateral, and transmitted to heirs. Note that these privileges 
attached to monte credits, not to the creditors82.  
A fiscal exemption granted a person for meritorious service was not automatically transmitted to 
an heir, but we know that it was common for the grantor to specify that the heirs of the grantee 
may also enjoy  the privilege. The grantor was also entitled to exclude female heirs, by specifying 
that only male descendants could inherit the privilege. A privilege differed from a right (ius) in that 
it carried no corresponding duties. But such duties typically accompanied a privilege that was 
transformed into a contract. A prime example of a privilegium contractum was the grant of 
citizenship that became irrevocable and heritable (civilitas contracta), according to Bartolo, after 
the grantee had satisfied residency and tax requirements83. Baldo was in basic agreement with 
Bartolo on the contractual nature of acquired citizenship and fiscal immunities, and treated civilitas 
per contractum as a privilegium reale and consequently heritable84. And he also insisted that the 
emperor or a city-state like his native Perugia may lawfully annul the “irrevocable” contract of 
urban citizenship with their rural citizens (comitatenses), provided there is a legitimate reason — 
for instance, the comitatenses had not satisfied requirements to which they had agreed85.  
 
Consilium 
Without mincing words, the five sapientes were unanimous in unequivocally determining that the 
fiscal immunity and privilege granted by the commune shielded Iacopo from the prestanze levied 
by the Balìa. Their consilum might well have been entitled Pro Arriguccio et filiis. In the consilium 
edited in the Appendix, six terms (privilegium, beneficium, ius, immunitas, exceptio, and 
dispensatio ) were employed to refer to Arriguccio’s tax exemption. The special meanings 
attributed to each term derived from the alleged legal analogies to which they were linked. The 
trio, privilegium, beneficium, and ius, asserted the positive, that Arriguccio and Iacopo have had, 
and still have, a valid legal claim to the tax exemption. The complimentary trio, immunitas, 
exceptio, and dispensatio, asserted the negative, that father and son were free from the general 
obligation of shouldering prestanze.  
Nearly fifty arguments with one hundred analogies or citations of authorities were marshaled along 
a circuitous path leading to this foregone conclusion. The large majority of citations are to the 
Corpus iuris, the remainder to the Glossa ordinaria, Gratian’s Decretum, to the Decretales of 
Gregory IX and Liber Sextus of Bonifice VIII, and to the jurists Andrea Bonello da Barletta, Alberto 
Gandino, Iacopo d’Arena, Dino del Mugello, Guillaume de Cunh, and Cino da Pistoia. Given the 
indiscriminate pluralism and hyperspecification of the arguments, it is curious that the authority of 
                                                 
82 BARBADORO, Le finanze , cit., p. 645; N. RODOLICO, La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto  (1378-1382), 
Bologna 1905, pp. 274-75,  471.   
83 J.  KIRSHNER, ‘Civitas sibi faciat civem’: Bartolus of Sassoferrato ’s Doctrine on the making of a Citizen, in 
“Speculum”, 48 (1973), pp. 707ff.  
84 BONOLIS, ed. Questioni di diritto internazionale, cit., pp. 146-147, cons. 95: “Nam ista civilitas non est merum 
beneficium, nec mere conceditur contemplatione persone, sed potius contemplatione solutionis; unde qui solvit 
prospexisse non solum sibi, sed liberis suis... Preterea non apparet ex verbis quod istud beneficium sit 
personale, unde censeri debet reale, idest transitorium ad liberos”.  
85 MEIJERS, ed. Tractatus duo de vi et potestate, cit., p. 4: “quod facit ad statutum Perusii de civilitate 
comitatensium, quae lex transivit in contractum per solutionem impositae eis factae, et ideo non potest eis tolli 
dicta immunitas per supervenientem legem, nisi ex nova causa et publica utilitate; tunc tamen puto, quod eis 
competat repetitio soluti quasi causa non secuta et redacta ad non causam”; BALDUS ad C. 5. 16. 26, 
Donationes, cit., f. 198r, nn. 2-3: “Unde illi comitatenses, qui fuerunt recepti a civitate per legem aliquo dato, 
non posunt revocari in comitatum, quia facta relatione donationis ad legem, res transivit in contractum 
innominatum. Unde facta est irrevocabilis, nam nec imperator potest revocare contractum secum celebratum, 
nisi ex causa, quia sibi non impletur quod impleri debet, ut Cynus, supra, de legi., l. Digna vox. Interdum lex stat 
in finibus contractus, et isti contractus sunt clari”.  
 Bartolo, who died in 1357, two years before our consilium, was not alleged. Curious, because Baldo 
was obviously familiar with his teacher’s insistence on the irrevocability of a ius acquired by 
statute, even more so when it is buttressed by a derogatory clause86. This doctrine, also advocated 
by Dino del Mugello, Iacopo d’Arena, and Cino da Pistoia, provided an effective defense of privileges 
akin to Arriguccio’s. In the critical edition below, readers may sift through and study the 
consilium’s multilayered arguments, analogies, and distinctions. Here I limit myself to highlighting 
the main arguments to which I refer by paragraph number (indicated by ¶).  
Species derogat generi. The power of the Balìa to levy prestanze derived from general, rather 
than express, language. General language does not trump specific exceptions (cons. ¶ 5), which to 
this day remains a basic rule of legal drafting. The Balìa was granted powers to compel “omnes et 
singulas personas quas volent ad mutuandum”. It is understood that these vague words always 
imply an indefinite class of individuals legally liable for prestanze and persons who, lacking a 
legitimate privilege and immunity, are not exempt from shouldering prestanze (cons. ¶ 8). The 
authority of Andrea Bonello da Barletta was enlisted for the argument that a broadly worded law 
does not derogate from a special privilege (cons. ¶ 19). If the legislators had wished to annul the 
special privilege (species) granted to Arriguccio in the earlier provision, they should have inserted a 
derogatory clause in the subsequent provision (genus) establishing the Balià, saying “not 
withstanding that privilege or law granted on this matter (cons. ¶ 4)”. The failure to insert express 
language derogating from the special privilege was crucial, since general words do not cover 
individual exceptions, dispensations, and fiscal exemptions, all of which require express mention87.  
Annulling Iacopo’s fiscal exemption on the basis of the provision establishing the Balìa was 
patently indefensible. The ability of the Balìa to levy prestanze (facultas imponendi) was 
understood to be constrained by what is just and legal, and therefore prestanze may not be levied 
on someone who can defend himself with a lawful exception (exceptione legiptima) (cons. ¶ 1). 
Indeed lawful exceptions always operate against general wording applied unlawfully. General 
wording has the effect of beating off frivolous pleadings and subterfuges, but not lawful pleadings 
(iuste defensiones) (cons. ¶ 10). Since the officials of the Balìa have the power to levy prestanze on 
anyone whom they wish (volent), it would seem to follow that they are released from observance of 
the law. This is true insofar as the Balìa’s nonobservance is grounded in primitive equity (rudis 
equitas) which informs legal norms and, in consideration of unforeseen, emerging circumstances, 
allows deviations from the rigor of the law. But the Balìa’s release from observing the law does not 
operate in the face of established equity (ad iuris preceptum redacta), that is, equity hammered 
into law by Roman jurists and contemporary legislators (cons. ¶ 3). 
The officials of the Balìa were considered representatives and agents (commissari et mandatarii) 
of the commune, whose general mandate did not include the specific power of annulling a justly 
deserved privilege awarded by the principal (dominus) (cons. ¶ 11)88. Further, the general wording 
of the Balìa’s mandate may not operate against the legal presumption that, unless evidence to the 
contrary is introduced, the will of the principal is considered steadfast and resolutely consistent 
from the very beginning of an undertaking or an obligation (cons. ¶ 12). This presumption of law 
operates for, “it is most certain that the commune wished to confer a legal privilege (beneficium), 
though we are uncertain that they had wished to repeal it, for vague statements produce 
ambiguity. But where on one side there is certainty, and the other ambiguity, one must adhere to 
certainty (cons. ¶ 13)”. A proper assessment of the provision establishing the Balìa indicates that 
the legislator did not intend to harm the rights of single persons or remove a legal benefit 
(commodum) that someone acquired as private person from public property. Where the general 
                                                 
86 BARTOLUS ad D. 1. 1. 9, cit., Omnes populi, f. 11v, nn. 30-31; Tractatus super constitutione ‘Ad reprimendum’, 
in Consilia, quaestiones tractatus, Venice 1528, f. 99rv, § Non obstantibus. See also CORTESE, cit., La norma 
giuridica, Vol. 2 , p. 88, n. 87.  
87 On this doctrine, see FEDERICUS PETRUCIUS SENENSIS, Consilia sive mavis responsa, quaestiones, Venice 
1576, f. 100v, cons. 233, n. 2: “Item certum est, quod ad hoc ut tollitur privilegium vel rescriptum non sufficit 
generalis mentio, sed requitur specialis expressio”.  
88 The limited scope of the mandatum generale  also applied to Florentine ambassadors who were also invested 
with potestas and balìa.  
 intention of the legislator may operate against common benefits granted by general laws, it may not 
similarly operate against the rights of private persons (contra ius private persone) (cons. ¶ 15).  
Beneficium videtur irrrevocabile. The jurists conceded that the privilege was granted in way that, 
under normal circumstances, it could be revoked at the discretion of the authorities if there were a 
legitimate cause—for instance, the wrongful receipt of a benefit or because of public utility (cons. ¶ 
16)89. In the absence of a countervailing legitimate cause, however, the privilege appears to be 
irrevocable. First, a distinction is made between a privilege granted because of meritorious service, 
as in this case, which is classified as irrevocable, and one that is vulnerable to revocation because 
the benefits exceed the terms of the privilege (cons. ¶ 16). Second, the fiscal exemption granted to 
Arriguccio and his sons should be construed neither as an informal promise nor a gratuitous 
contract lacking an enforceable contractual obligation (ex nudo pacto non oritur actio). The 
exemption granted by the commune in response to Arriguccio’s petition and in recognition of his 
meritorious service must be construed as a voluntary contractual obligation on the part of the 
commune (cons.¶ 17).  
Accordingly, the specific law (lex) awarding the fiscal exemption was not a simple law, but one 
having the effect of a contract, since it was based on the mutual consent of the parties (cons. ¶ 18)90. 
This privilege-granting law, of course, did not bear any resemblance to the contracts classified in 
Justininan’s Institutes (3. 13). Yet in accordance with the notion that any obligation may be 
considered a contract (D. 5. 1. 20), the privilege-granting law may be considered an enforceable 
contractual obligation with regard to Arriguccio and his sons. With regard to other persons, the law 
is not a contract but an enforceable directive (preceptum), the conventional definition of lex. It 
might be countered that the contract fails because the commune offered the fiscal exemption in 
Arriguccio’s absence and thus without his consent, leaving the contract unconsummated and 
therefore invalid. The counter-counterargument was this: one can infer on the basis of Arriguccio’s 
petition requesting the fiscal exemption, which both embodied his consent and was duly approved 
by the legislative councils, that he had in fact accepted the grant of immunity (cons. ¶ 18).  
At this juncture, one-third way through the consilium, a defense was mounted on behalf of the 
Balìa’s prerogatives, which rested on establishing the hypothetical intent of the Signoria and the 
legislative councils (cons. ¶ 20). Did the Signoria and the legislative councils, through the plenary 
powers vested in the sixteen officials, wish to annul the privilege granted to Arriguccio and his sons, 
even though the privilege was admittedly granted for a legitimate reason (ex causa), not for 
favoritism (per ambitionem)? The admission was significant, because under lex Ambitiosa (D. 50. 
9. 4), a decree of the decurions (equivalent to a measure enacted by the members of the legislative 
councils in Florence)91 which favors someone by releasing him from paying his debts is not valid 
and should be annulled. Notwithstanding the legitimately granted privilege, it seems possible to 
infer on the basis of the plenary powers vested in the sixteen officials that the privilege fell within 
the ambit of the powers vested in the Balìa, and five reasons in defense of the inference were 
alleged. 
Tanta auctoritas quantum habet totus populus. First, the authority of the Balìa, which derived 
from the populus Florentie, is plenary. Indeed, to exercise its prerogatives and perform its 
mandated functions maximally, the Balìa “is given as much authority as has the entire people of 
Florence (cons. ¶ 21)”. Such unqualified authority was customarily vested by the legislative councils 
in the Signoria and Balìa, which required plenary powers to carry out their mandated charges 
expeditiously. The stock phrase, tanta auctoritas quantum habet totus populus, did not actually 
                                                 
89 Baldo, following Cino da Pistoia, opined that on grounds of public utility a generally worded derogatory cause 
may annul a specific statute. BALDUS ad C. 1. 14. 8, Humanum, cit., f. 69rv, nn. 4-5. However, the generally 
worded derogatory clause may not operate to someone’s detriment, such as the annulment of a statutory 
privilege granted ex causa.  
90 For medieval doctrines on mutual consent as the binding force of contracts, see J. GORDLEY, The 
Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine , Oxford 1991, pp. 41ff.  
91 On the identification of the medieval consiliarii with Roman decuriones, see P. COSTA, Iurisdictio. Semantica 
del potere politico nella pubblicista medievale (1100-1433), Milan 1969, pp. 215-2 1 7 . 
 appear in the provision establishing the Balìa of 135892. But its variant was present — namely, that 
the Balìa was authorized, save express exceptions, to take whatever measures it saw fit to raise 
urgently needed funds, just as if these measures were authored and affirmed by the people of 
Florence. Second, the provision establishing the Balìa contained a derogatory clause that clearly 
manifested an intention to preclude in advance any contrary provision, law or statute, including 
those which required explicit revocation or repeal. Third, the provision remains operative against 
exceptions, whether they are lumped altogether, as here, or mentioned one-by-one. At any rate, in 
view of the analogy to C. 7. 39. 4, Omnes, the provision should be interpreted and understood to 
have included all the individual contrary cases that may exist, even though they were not 
enumerated. Fourth, exceptions which are valid confirm the rule against exceptions that are not — 
namely, Arriguccio’s tax exemption. Fifth, the immunity in question does not extend to 
extraordinary levies like prestanze (cons. ¶ 21). The last point is a puzzling, since the privilege 
granted Arriguccio was meant to be impermeable to prestanze.  
In their rhetorical defense of the Balìa, the jurists omitted the legal maxim and argument, ex certa 
scientia93. This maxim signified the pope’s and emperor’s absolute knowledge of the law and the 
ensuing fiction and presumption that the pope and the emperor, in new and subsequent laws, 
certainly intended to abrogate existing and prior express laws, even though this specific intention 
was not mentioned; it also signified that the pope and emperor acted with the absolute knowledge 
of all existing and prior laws and norms that could be said to contradict their new laws. In theory, 
this maxim was a powerful weapon in the arsenal of papal, imperial, and princely authority but it 
was also authoritarian, employed as a last resort to override opposing arguments grounded in iusta 
causa and jurisprudential interpretation94. The force of this maxim was acknowledged by our 
jurists. Someone’s right may be taken away by imperial rescript, it was conceded later in the 
consilium (cons. ¶ 48), but the revocation must be performed ex certa scientia —that is, overtly. 
Had the provision establishing the Balìa of 1358 included in its derogatory clause the phrase, ex 
certa scientia, then the presumption that the legislative councils and the Signoria had acted to 
annul Iacopo’s exemption would have had some traction. But the general wording of the provision 
made the argument ex certa scientia immaterial to the contested exemption.  
To rebut the counterclaim that the intention of the legislative councils and the Signoria to annul the 
privilege could be inferred from the plenary powers vested in the Balìa and the general derogatory 
clause of the provision establishing this office, four arguments were presented (cons. ¶ 25). First, 
Arriguccio’s tax exemption doubtlessly originated from the unilateral declaration of will or promise 
(pollicitatio) made to the Della Scala. Although the promise was neither expressly annulled nor 
confirmed by the Signoria and the legislative councils, it was always tacitly assumed to be valid. 
There remained two unstated-but-always-implied obstacles impeding the exemption. A stipulation 
in favor of a third party is not valid (alteri stipulari nemo potest)95. In addition, it was widely held 
                                                 
92 See, for example, a provision about hiring, or perhaps bribing, mercenaries encamped near Arezzo (ASF, PR, 
50, f. 99r, 15 Feb. 1362/63): “Et circa quelibet dependentia, coherentia vel connexa predictis vel a predictis vel 
aliquo ipsorum dicti domini priores et vexillifer, gonfalonerii societatum populi et duodecim boni viri communis 
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baliam, auctoritatem et potestatem quam habet totus populus et commune Florentie ”. For additional examples, 
see PR, 60, f. 53rv, (3 July 1372); f. 107rv, (19 Nov. 1372), ff. 135r-139r, 138v (22 Dec. 1372), ff. 143r-147v,  
147r (11 Jan. 1372/73).  
93 On the maxim, ex certa scientia, see O. CONDORELLI, ‘Quum sint facti et in facto consistant.’ Note su 
consuetudini e statuti in margine a una costituzione di Bonifacio VIII (‘Licet Romanus Pontifex’, VI. 1. 2.1), in 
“Rivista internazionale di diritto comune”, 10 (1999), pp. 205-295; J. KRYNEN, ‘De nostre certaine science’. 
Remarques sur l’absolutisme législatif de la monarchie médiévale française, in Renaissance du pouvoir législatif 
et genèse de l’Etat, cit., pp. 131 -144; Cortese, La norma giuridica, cit., Vol. 2, pp. 81 -99.  
94 For the use of the maxim, ex certa scientia, in a case involving the Este of Ferrara in the early fifteenth century, 
see M. CAVINA, Carlo Ruini. Una ‘autorità’ del diritto comune fra Reggio Emilia e Bologna, fra XV e XVI secolo , 
Milan 1998, pp. 115-126.  
95 On this rule and the exceptions to it, see R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition, Deventer-Boston, 1990, pp. 34ff; for the medieval period, H. LANGE, ‘Alteri stipulari nemo 
potest’ bei Legisten und Kanonisten, in “Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Rom. Abt.”, 73 
 that a simple unilateral promise does not create a natural-law obligation96. The jurists rejoined that 
the Signoria’s promise was valid as either pollicitatio or pactum. A simple verbal declaration of the 
will (pollicitatio) of the Signoria to give a tax exemption compels performance, even in the absence 
of the third party (Arriguccio) for whom the promise was made97. In effect, Arriguccio acquired a 
direct right to command the promised performance98. Whether he legally accepted or relied on the 
promise was immaterial, because a unilateral promise made for a legitimate reason (ex causa) and 
in good faith is binding on the declarant, without the acceptance of the third party. Ultimately, the 
pollicitatio was binding because it is treated as a sworn promise enforceable under canon law99. By 
parity of reason, if one treats the tax exemption in favor of the absent Arriguccio as the result of a 
mutual verbal agreement (pactum) between Florence and the Della Scala, it is binding under both 
natural and civil law. However the promise of the Signoria is construed, it continues to be binding.  
The Signoria’s agreement is said to have even have greater enforceability, for it was made on 
behalf of the people of Florence whose authority, for argument’s sake, corresponds to that of the 
emperor (princeps) (cons. ¶ 25). Agreements made by the Florentine populus princeps, like 
contracts made by Roman princeps, are understood to have the force of law in the city-state 
(provincia)100 over which it exercises authority. And in accordance with the lex Digna vox (C. 1. 14. 
4), the populus princeps of Florence, like the Roman princeps, must faithfully observe its own laws, 
lest the republic succumb to disorder, and by analogy to Roman history, fall prey to conspiracy and 
civic strife. In other words, citizens are encouraged to obey the laws when they see that the same 
laws are freely observed by the very officials and magistrates charged with their promulgation and 
enforcement. Weighty support for this commendable ideal of legality, an ideal that was also 
championed by supporters of popular regimes in Florence101, derived from Cino da Pistoia’s 
commentary on the lex Digna vox. The Pistoian jurist famously declared that the emperor is 
obliged to observe a pactum he has made with a city-state or baron, that a contract made by the 
emperor is law, and that the emperor may not seize someone’s property without just cause102. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(1956), pp. 279 ff. It is worth mentioning that in Trecento Florence agreements made in favor of third parties 
were common.  
96 See the discussion of BARTOLUS ad D. 2. 14. 27. 2, Si unus, § Pactus ne peteret, cit., f. 92v, n. 16. 
97 Originally, pollicitatio  referred to a unilateral promise made by a Roman citizen during an electoral campaign 
that, upon taking office, he would make a gift to his city. The promise was considered binding. See G. ARCHI, La 
pollicitatio nel diritto romano , in his Scritti di diritto romano , Milan 1981, Vol, 2, pp. 137 -161; J. ROUSSIER, Le 
sens du mot ‘pollicitatio’ chez les juriste romains, in “Revue internationale de droit de l’antiquité”, 3 (1949), pp. 
295-317; N. Hayashi, Die ‘pecunia’ in der ‘pollicitatio ob honorem’, in “Klio”, 71 (1989), pp. 383-398. As far as I 
know, there is no study of pollicitatio in the Middle Ages. But see R. VOLANTE, Il sistema contrattuale del diritto 
comune classico. Struttura dei patti e individuazione del tipo. Glossatori e ultramontani, Milan 2001, pp. 34, 
36ff, esp. 294ff. For early modern developments, see T. B. SMITH, Pollicitatio—Promise and Offer, in Studies 
Critical and Comparative, Edinburgh-New York 1962, pp. 168-182; ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations, cit., 
pp. 574ff.  
98 See PAULUS DE CASTRO, Consilia, Venice 1581, Vol. 2, f. 163v, cons. 342, n. 2: “et omnis pollicitatio continet 
pactum secuto consensu alterius cui facta est, vel etiam si non est secutus si facta, est pollicitatio propter 
honorem consequendum valet, et producit actus vel ius exigendi”.  
99 L. KOLMER, Promissorische Eide im Mittelalter, Kalmünz 1989; R. HELMHOLZ, The Spirit of Classical Canon 
law , Athens-London 1996, pp. 161ff.  
100 On the equation between the city-state and the Roman provincia made by Trecento jurists, see CANNING, The 
Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, cit., pp. 125-127.   
101 According to Najemy, in the eyes of the Flo rentine popolo  the legitimate exercise of political power was linked 
to four criteria: consent, representation, delegation, and accountability. He also argues that the popolo ’s 
discourse of legality was opportunistically adapted by the Florentine political elites to sustain oligarchic power 
in the late Trecento and early Quattrocento. See J. NAJEMY, The Dialogue of Power in Florentine Politics, in 
Athens and Rome, Florence and Venice: City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, edd. A. MOLHO, 
K. RAAFLAUB, J. EMLEIN, Stuttgart 1991, p. 283. As I argue at the end of this paper, however, the commitment 
of sapientes communis to the rule of law was far less amenable to oligarchic manipulation.  
102 CYNUS ad C. 1. 14. 4, In Codicem commentaria, Frankfurt am Main 1578, ff. 25v-26r. For discussions of the 
glosses and commentaries regarding the lex Digna vox, see R. W. and A. J. CARLYLE, A History of Medieval 
Political Theory in the West, Edinburgh-London 1962, Vol. 6, pp. 14-17; U. NICOLINI, La proprietà e 
l’espropriazione per pubblica utilità. Studi sulla dottrina giuridica intermedia, Milan 1952, pp. 127ff; CORTESE, 
La norma giuridica, cit., Vol. 1, pp. 143ff; D. WYDUCKEL, Princeps Legibus Solutus. Eine Untersuchung zur 
 Invoked, too, was the opinion of the Roman jurist, Paulus, in D. 32. 1. 23, Ex imperfecto, that the 
emperor “should observe the laws from which he himself is considered to be free”. It would be 
foolish, in face of these proof-texts, to cast doubt on the intentions of the Signoria to uphold the 
validity of its original agreement with the Della Scala and the subsequent tax immunity granted 
Arriguccio, both of which have the force of law.  
Second, if the immunity were construed as nothing more than a gratuitous donation, which does not 
require reciprocal performance and compensation, it would then be open to challenge on the 
grounds that the commune’s obligation was limited by what its finances allow. Given the fiscal 
straits of Florence in 1358, the immunity could thus be reduced or annulled. The promise and grant 
of immunity, the jurists continued to insist, arose from the intention to reward Arriguccio and sons 
with a specific compensation for meritorious service. The terms of the grant, once made, may not 
be unilaterally modified by the grantor. Analogy is made to lex In commodato, § Sicut (D. 13. 6. 17. 
3), where a gratuitous loan of goods (commodatum) is made for a definite period. Afterwards the 
lender wants to modify the terms, but the lex states that he may neither unilaterally change the 
terms nor reclaim the goods before the expiration of the mutually determined period (cons. ¶ 27).  
Third, absurditas est vitanda. Manifestly absurd consequences arising from the application of a 
statute should be avoided, a medieval maxim which approximates the so-called golden rule of 
modern statutory interpretation103. Classic absurdities include a statute transferring to an heir or a 
creditor greater rights than those possessed by the deceased; or a person who by obeying the law is 
worse off than one who does not. To avoid reductio ad absurdum, the jurist-interpreter had to 
establish the hypothetical intent of the legislator or the principal party authorizing the sixteen 
officials. It is ridiculous to believe, our jurists opined, that the officials of the Balìa, charged with 
acting in good faith as agents of the people of Florence, would perform acts that the Signoria was 
unlikely to do, such as harming Arriguccio. “In fact, it is unlikely that the people of Florence, the 
source of the laws in Florence’s city-state, had wished to inflict harm on Arriguccio, snatching away 
without cause what it had granted him for meritorious service. For these <acts> constitute great 
injuries (cons. ¶ 29)”. 
Fourth, the wording of the provision establishing the Balìa should be construed narrowly, meaning 
that it should not be expanded through equitable interpretation to cover cases not specifically 
contained in the provision (cons. ¶ 31). We have come full circle, as more citation-filled arguments 
were presented to show once again that the general wording of this provision may not operate 
against a specific privilege legitimately granted. Not even such an august authority as the emperor, 
much less that of the legislators of a city-state, may annul an irrevocable privilege sine causa (cons. 
¶¶ 43, 45). Finally, the authority of Hostiensis served to demonstrate “that a privilege conferred ex 




Having accepted the determination of the jurists, the sixteen officials of the Balìa upheld Iacopo’s 
exemption and cancelled the prestanze for which he had been assessed. Soon after, the treasury 
officials (regulatores) acted to affirm the Balìa’s decision. These executive decisions stemming “de 
consilio multorum iurisperitorum” were duly recorded in the registers of the prestanze104. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                
frühmodernen Rechts-und Staatslehre , Berlin 1979, pp. 52ff; and J. VALLEJO, Ruda equidad, ley consumada 
concepcion de la potestad normativa (1250-1350), Madrid 1992, pp. 335ff.  
103 On argumentum ab absurdis, see SBRICCOLI, L’interpretazione dello statuto , cit., pp. 356-366.  
104 ASF, Prestanze, 6, f. 14r (Jun. 1359?): “Jacopus Arriguccii Pegolotti ... florenos settuaginta unum auri”. Add. 
marg. sin.: “Apparet dictum Jacopum Arrigucci fuisse et esse per officium sedecim liberatum et absolutum a 
solutione dicte prestantie propter immunitatem et privilegium eidem a communi Florentie concessum. De qua 
liberatione et absolutione patet ex actis dictorum sedicim, publicis scriptis manu ser Pieri Mutini, anno 
MCCCLVIIIo, die IIIIo mensis decembris, de consilio multorum iurisperitorum in dicta deliberatione sedecim 
descriptorum”; Prestanze, 10, f. 8v (1359): “Jacopus Arrigucci Pegolotti ... florenos quattuor, solidos quindecim, 
denarios decem ad aurum. Item ... florenos duos, solidos decemnovem, denarios duo”. Add. marg. sin.: 
“Apparet dictum Jacopum Arrigucci (fuisse del.) non debere gravari pro dicta prestantia solvenda, quia habet 
privilegium et im<m>unitatem (per officium sedecim liberatum a solutione dicte prestantie del.) a communi 
 swiftness of executive justice in this case was consistent with dozens of other cases in the second 
half of the fourteenth century in which Florentine treasury officials approved petitions from citizens 
and resident foreigners requesting cancellation of erroneous tax assessments105.  
Although the magnitude of Baldo’s contribution to the consilium is unknowable, it is fair to assume 
that had he alone composed the consilium, he would have presented comparable arguments and 
conclusions. In making this assumption, I am aware that I run the risk of committing the fallacy of 
identity, the assumption that Baldo’s positions, most of which were developed in later works and 
consilia, must have resembled those inhabiting the consilium of 1359. To avoid this pitfall, I have 
hitherto refrained from conflating Baldo’s later positions with those presented in the consilium, 
even when the family resemblance is striking. Support for my assumption resides in the career-
long consistency of his positions on statutory interpretation, privileges, and public pacts and 
contracts.  
Baldo regularly resorted to the maxim, species derogat generi, when arguing that a special law 
annuls a general or less special law, and that those granted a special exemption from the law are 
not subject to general statutes or rescripts106. A special law fortified by a derogatory clause was 
subject to repeal only if it was expressly mentioned in the derogatory clause of the later law107. 
Further, amorphous laws yielding absurd and evil results are invalid108. Even “the emperor, 
employing general wording, is not understood to wish to grant what is wicked or absurd. For which 
reason, though he grants someone the ability to make a testament freely, he may not grant the 
ability to pass over silently or disinherit a child without legitimate reason”109. Baldo’s influential 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Florentie. Et propterea fuit per Regulatores deliberatum et declaratum ipsum non debere gravari, ut patet 
manu mei Pauli eorum notarii, die XIIo, mensis Junii, MCCLIXo, XIII indictione, visa deliberatione facta per 
officium sedecim monete et consilio super hiis habito per dictum officium sedecim per multos iurisperitos in 
dicta deliberatione descriptos”. For another cancellation of Iacopo’s levy , see Prestanze, 13, f. 18r (1362).  
105 See the cancellation of prestanze  levies in 1362 on three citizens of Poggibonsi residing in Florence, because 
they had already been assessed in their native town; see ASF, Prestanze, 13, ff. 43v, 50r, 57r. The reduction and 
cancellation of prestanze  levies were common in the early 1360s. See BRUCKER, Florentine Politics and Society, 
cit., p. 196.  
106 BALDUS, Consilia, cit., Vol. 1, f. 26r, cons.78, n. 1 (=BAV, Barb. lat. 1408, f. 41v); Vol. 2, f. 83r, cons. 292, n. 3 
(=BAV, Barb, lat. 1404, f. 147rv): “semper species derogat generi, etiam si non essent verba derogatoria vel 
contraria, sive species precedat genus, sive sequatur, ut in regulis generi per speciem”; ad VI 45. 13. 34, “Generi 
: Speties que adversatur generi derogat generi”, ed. LALLY, cit., Vol. 2, p. 316; ad X 1. 3. 6, Cum ordinem, In 
Decretalium volumen commentaria, Venice 1595, f. 31r, n. 50: “Solutio: illa regula non habet locum im 
privilegium, quia privilegium eo, quod continet ius singulare, semper habetur loco speciei specialissime, ut no. 
ff. de legi., l. Ius singulare  (D. 1. 3. 16), et ideo non tollitur nedum per rescriptum, sed nec per constitutionem 
generalem sequentem, ut sing. no., l. Decurionibus, C. de silentiariis, lib. 12 (citing the same lex that our jurists 
cited in 1359)”. In a consilium written while Baldo was teaching at Padua, we read: “et ista pars est vera, quia 
generali statuto non includuntur exempti, quod est not. expresse C. de silentiariis, l. Decurionibus”. For the 
quote, J. KIRSHNER, Between Nature and Culture: An Opinion of Baldus of Perugia on Venetian Citizenship as 
Second Nature , in “The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies”, 9 (1979), p. 206. See also NICOLINI, La 
proprietà, cit., p. 173. 
107 KIRSHNER, ‘Ars imitatur naturam’, cit., p. 316. 
108 SBRICCOLI, L’interpretazione dello statuto , cit., p. 358. 
109 BALDUS ad C. 3. 28. 35, Si Quando, cit., f. 203r, n. 4: “Tertio, not. quod princeps sub verbis generalibus non 
intelligitur velle concedere illud quod est inquum vel absurdum. Unde licet concedat alicui quod libere possit 
testari, tamen non potest filium preterire vel exheredare sine causa. Item iste non potest puberi substituere 
directo, ut ff. de vulg. Substi., l. Ex facto, in prin. (D. 28. 6. 43 pr)”. Similar point made by Baldo in his much 
debated consilium on the authority of Giangaleazzo Visconti (post 1395), with arguments closely resembling 
those used in the consilium of 1359: “Item princeps de perpetuo postest facere corruptibile, non tamen in 
preiudicium alterius, licet dominus mundi sit, quia illud intelligitur quoad bonum, et naturale regimen ne 
iniuriarum nascatur occasio unde iura nascuntur, ut C. unde vi l. Meminerint, et maxime quia in dubio princeps 
non intelligitur iura privatorum tollere, et maxime verbis generalibus vel effusis, ut C. de emancip. liber. l. Nec 
avus. ff. ne quid in loco publico l. ii. § Si quis a principe. C. de prec. imperat. offer. l. Rescripta. ff. de vulgari 
subst. l. Ex facto, et est expressum in c. Si propter tua, de rescript. lib. vi”. This consilium is edited by K. 
PENNINGTON, The Authority of the Prince in a Consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis, in Studia in honorem 
Eminentissimi Cardinalis Alphonsi M. Stickler, ed. R. I. Card. CASTILLO LARA, Rome 1992, pp 483-516, quote on 
p. 503.  
 opinion that under canon law an informal agreement is binding, provided there is legitimate 
reason110, was in harmony with the interpretation of the Signoria’s promise to the Della Scala 
Recognizing the inescapable perils arising from legally unregulated power, Baldo insisted that 
immutable natural law obliges princes to uphold contracts that they themselves have entered111. 
Thus a privilege, after having been transformed into a contract, may not be revoked112. By the 
same token, the privileges granted by a prince having contractual force—even if they are opposed 
to utilitas publica—are fully enforceable, so long as they are in conformity with good faith, natural 
equity, and the conventional meanings of words113. True, accepting seigniorial power as an 
enduring, multifaceted reality, Baldo qualified Bartolo’s premonitory and totalizing invective 
against the signori -tiranni afflicting Italy (tota Italia)114. Still, it cannot be emphasized too strongly 
that, despite his differences with Bartolo, Baldo remained an uncompromising foe of tyranny 115. He 
fully agreed with his teacher that since a tyrant lacks all jurisdiction, any statute he himself enacts 
is ipso iure unenforceable. By definition, therefore, any statute lacking legitimate reason (iusta 
causa) is considered equivalent to a law enacted by a tyrant116. Baldo and his fellow jurists did not 
hesitate to sanction exceptional measures taken by public authorities with plenary powers, when 
                                                 
110 See A. SÖLLNER, Die causa im Konditionen-und Vertragsrecht des Mittelalters bei den Glossatoren. 
Kommentoren und Kanonisten, in “Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Rom. Abt.”, 77 (1960), 
p. 250; HORN, Aequitas, cit., pp. 184-189; GORDLEY, The Philosophical Origins, cit., p. 56.  
111 K. PENNINGTON, The Authority of the Prince, cit., p. 490, and his The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. 
Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1993, pp. 216-217.  See also E. 
CORTESE, Intorno alla causa impositionis e a taluni aspetti privatistici delle finanze medievali, in his Scritti, 
edd. I. BIROCCHI and U. PETRONIO, Spoleto 1999, p. 165. I find unconvincing Canning’s argument that in 
recognizing that the princeps has the absolute power to expropriate his subjects’ property in disregard of higher 
norms, Baldo thereby accepted “the reality of the exercise of pure power”. See his Italian Juristic Thought and 
the Realities of Power in the Fourteenth Century , in Political Thought and the Realities of Power in the Middle 
Ages, ed. J. CANNING and O. G. OEXLE, Göttingen 1998 (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Geschichte, 147), pp. 229-239, quote on p. 237.  
112 BALDUS ad D. 1. 6. 2, Si Dominus, cit., f. 33v, n. 2 : “Aut privilegium transivit in contractum; et tunc non potest 
revocari”. 
113 BALDUS, Consilia, cit., Vol. 1, f. 34v, cons. 112, n. 9 (=BAV, Barb. lat. 1408, f. 61r): “Ultimo queritur, qualiter 
verba in ista materia sunt interpretanda? Respondeo, in privilegiis, que sunt contra publicam utilitatem, 
interpretantur valde stricte et rigorose, ut not. Gul in l. Beneficium, ff. de consti. prin. (D. 1. 4. 3.pr.). Sed nos 
sumus hic in via contractus, in quo debet servari bona fides et equitas naturalis, verbis tamen congruens vel 
communi intellectui loquentium”. In this vein, see also D. QUAGLIONI, I limiti delle sovranità: il pensiero di Jean 
Bodin nella cultura poltica e giuridica dell’età moderna, Padua 1992, pp. 68ff; M. CARAVALE, Ordinamenti 
giuridici dell’Europa medievale , Bologna 1994, p. 540; M. MECCARELLI, Arbitrium: un aspetto sistematico degli 
ordinamenti giuridici in età di diritto comune , Milan 1998, esp. 108ff; and M. Fioravanti, Costituzione , Bologna 
1999, p. 31: “Possiamo così formulare un primo carattere generale della nostra costituzionale medievale. È il 
carattere della intrinseca limitatezza dei poteri pubblici”.  
114 F. ERCOLE, Da Bartolo all’Althusio. Saggi sulla storia del pensiero pubblicistico del rinascimento italiano , 
Florence 1932, p. 361; J. CANNING, “Permanence and Change in Baldus’s Political Thought”, in “Ius Commune. 
Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte”, 27 (2000), pp. 283-298, who, however, ignores the concrete 
institutional contexts in which all forms of public power were exercised and in which Baldo himself operated and 
gave his opinions. There is no evidence that Baldo or the Lombard Jurists he met while teaching at Pavia (1390-
1400) subordinated law to Viscontean power. In fact, Lombard jurists and judges, who constituted a powerful 
clique, resisted the Visconti’s attempt to politicize civil and criminal procedure in the late Trecento and early 
Quattrocento. For a discriminating treatment of these issues, see C. STORTI STORCHI, Giudici e giuristi nelle 
riforme viscontee del processo civile per Milano (1330-1386), in Ius mediolani, cit., pp. 47 -187. See also J. 
BLACK, The Limits of Ducal Authority: A Fifteenth-Century Treatise on the Visconti and their Subject Cities, in 
Florence and Italy: Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein, edd. P. DENLEY and C. ELAM, London 
1988, pp. 149-160. 
115 D. QUAGLIONI, ‘Un Tractatus de tyranno’: il commento di Baldo degli Ubaldi (1327?-1400) alla lex 
Decernimus, C. De sacrosantis ecclesiis (C. 1, 2, 16), in “Il pensiero politico”, 13 (1980), pp. 64-7 7 .  Baldo’s 
commentary on the lex Decernimus, which is edited by Quaglioni, was delivered around 1365, soon after Baldo 
returned from Florence to Perugia. Osvaldo Cavallar and I have translated his commentary, which will appear in 
our forthcoming anthology of medieval Italian jurisprudential texts in English translation. 
116 QUAGLIONI, Legislazione statutaria e dottrina della legislazione , cit., p. 64. 
 warranted by compelling necessity and public utility117. That is why they affirmed, in general terms, 
the Balìa’s exercise of coercive power (potestas coercendi) to raise funds through forced loans 
from citizens in legitimate emergencies118. The target of their objections in particular cases like the 
one discussed here was the exercise of coercive governmental power in violation of the higher 
norms of equity and natural law119.  
Florentine public officials and legislators, whether popolani, new men, or patricians, were 
consummate realists; they did not advocate blind adherence to the letter of the law. They 
recognized that no single piece of legislation, even one flawlessly drafted, could cover all contingent 
imperatives or balance competing interests. They conceded that the application of statutory 
regulations and fiscal measures designed to promote communal welfare simultaneously, and 
sometimes brutally, invaded the lives of individuals and groups. As a corrective, they continually 
sought to make the exercise of coercive governmental power accountable to public justification, and 
introduced remedies offering citizens and noncitizen residents, corporate bodies, and subject 
communities the genuine possibility of redressing the arbitrary deprivation of their privileges and 
rights. The institution of the sapientes communis was among the most effective of these remedies: 
one that gave life to the commune’s fundamental obligation to apply its own laws impartially and 
equitably, “leaving aside love, hatred, fear, and all emotion (remotis amore, hodio, timore et omni 
passione)”120. This commitment to the rule of law was exemplarily realized in the consilium 






Consilium of Francesco di Lotto Salviati, Baldo degli Ubaldi, Francesco di Bicci Albergotti, 
Niccola Lapi, and Luigi Gianfigliazzi  
A printed version of the consilium, to my knowledge, does not exist. My edition is based on the two 
extant manuscripts copies: Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, Cod. 83, 322 rv, 320v-321r, saec. XV, 
hereafter cited as B; and BAV, Vat. lat. 14094, ff. 373r-378r, saec. XV, hereafter cited as V. A full 
                                                 
117 CARLYLE, A History of Medieval Political Theory, cit., Vol. 6, pp. 85ff; NICOLINI, La proprietà e 
l’espropriazione per pubblica utilità , cit., pp. 23ff; M. H. KEEN, The Political Thought of the Fourteenth-Century 
Civilians, in Trends in Medieval Political Thought, ed. B. SMALLEY, New York 1965, pp. 122-123. On the topos, 
necessitas, see M. ASCHERI, Note per la storia dello stato di necessità, in “Studi senesi”, 87 (1975), pp. 7 -94.  
118 Although Baldo had reservations about the morality of the interest paid to the creditors of Florence’s public 
debt (Monte Comune), he gave concessive approval to the imposition of interest-bearing forced loans on the 
grounds that they were not technically loans. BALDUS ad C. 1. 1. 1, Cunctos populos, cit., f. 6v, nn. 34-35: “... 
quod prestatio quae fit Florentiae habentibus pecuniam in monte sit licita, quia est inducta favore 
communitatis, ne solvere cogatur creditoribus sortem. Nam illud non proprie est mutuum, cum reddi non 
debeat, sed est quaedam subventio in communi et quaedam collecta necessaria”.  
119 Their vision of legality was also shared by Florence’s chancellor, Coluccio Salutati. See DE ROSA, Coluccio 
Salutati, cit., pp. 108, 149.  
120 ASF, Pareri dei Savi, 3, f. 353v. The exhortation was addressed to Filippo di Tommaso Corsini, Francesco di 
Lorenzo Machiavelli, Alessandro di Salvi Bencivenni, Torello di Niccolò Torelli, and Nello di Giuliano of San 
Gimignano, the jurists commissioned in 1414 to write a consilium (ff. 353v-357r) on the legality of a prestanzone  
assessment imposed on Filippo and Matteo Scolari. I plan to publish an edition of this consilium in a future study 
on the competency of Florentine Balìe. 
121 From the 1360s onward, hundreds of such consilia addressing disputes on the application of Florence’s statuti 
and provvisioni underscored that the consultors’ commitment to rule of law was not an empty gesture but a 
robust reality. See, for instance, KIRSHNER, Citizen Cain of Florence, in La Toscane et les Toscans autour de la 
Renaissance. Mélanges offerts à Charles de la Roncière, Aix -en Provence 1999, pp. 175-92. Nor was their 
commitment a fig leaf for oligarchic power. See KIRSHNER, Consilia as Authority in Late Medieval Italy, cit., pp. 
132-140, and J. BLACK, Constitutional Ambitions, Legal Realities and the Florentine State, in Florentine 
Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power, edd. W. J. CONNELL and A. ZORZI, Cambridge 2000, pp. 48-64. 
Mounting evidence lends support to Martines’s informed and original insight that before the advent of the Medici 
in 1434, Florentine jurists “revealed no obvious inclination to strengthen the hand of the executive”. See 
MARTINES, Lawyers and Statecraft , cit., p. 402.  
 description of B is found in I Codici del Collegio di Spagna di Bologna, ed. D. MAFFEI et alii, Milan 
1992, pp. 196-279, esp. 262, n. 419. Although there are no major divergences between B and V, I 
have used V as my base text, for it consistently offers better readings and fewer omissions. For the 
sake of readability, capitalization and punctuation follow modern practice, while paragraph divisions 
follow those in V. So that I could more efficiently refer to individual arguments in the body of the 
consilum, I have added numbers in parentheses before each paragraph. All variants and 
emendations have been duly noted in the apparatus. Angle brackets (< >) are used to indicate my 
additions to the text. In preparing the edition I have sought to follow the recommendations on 
editorial practice presented by S. KUTTNER, Notes on the Presentation of Text and Apparatus in 
Editing the Works of Decretists and Decretalists, in “Traditio”, 15 (1959), pp. 452-464.  
EDITION 
Cum per dominos priores artium et vexilliferum iustitie populi et communis Florentie, una cum 
gonfaloneriis societatum populi et duodecim bonis viris communis Florentie in sufficienti numero 
congregatos, iuxta occurentes necessitates conservationi et utilitati rei publice communis Florentie 
providere volentes, habentes de infrascriptis baliam et potestatem per solempnia et opportuna 
consilia populi et communis Florentie eis concessam, electi fuerunt sedecim boni viri secundum 
formam reformationum super hiis editam per iam dicta consilia. Quibus et duabus partibus eorum 
data et concessa fuit in effectu balia inter alia posse invenire, providere <et> firmare omnem 
modum et viam quem vellent per quem redditus, introitus et proventus seu erarium communis 
Florentie augeatur seu per quem pecunia veniat in commune predicto. Et pro predictis et circa 
predicta et predictorum omnium expeditione possent condere provisiones et illa ordinamenta que 
vellent, que omnia perinde valeant in omnibus et per omnia ac si facta, composita et firmata 
fuissent per populum et commune Florentie. Et quod postea magnifici et potentes viri domini 
priores artium et vexillifer iustitie populi et communis Florentie, considerantes dictam provisionem 
de qua supra dicitur et baliam et potestatem ipsis sedecim traditam non sufficeret ad habendum 
pecuniam opportunam, habita deliberatione decenti, providerunt, ordinaverunt et deliberaverunt 
et per opportuna consilia iam dicta populi et communis provideri et deliberari fecerunt inter alia 
infrascriptum capitulum infrascripte continentie et tenoris in effectu, videlicet: 
Et insuper quod dicti sedecim cives seu offitiales et due partes eorum possint eisque liceat semel et 
pluries et quotienscunque omnes et singulas personas quas volent ad mutuandum, ut dictum est, et 
ipsa mutua faciendum in ea et eis pecuniarum quantitatem quibus volent cogere et compellere et 
cogi et compelli122 facere summarie et de facto omnibus iuris et facti remediis, et per domorum 
destructionem et personarum123 detentionem, et alio quovis modo; et circa ipsorum inobedientium, 
cohertionem et penam facere et componere illas provisiones et illa ordinamenta que volent, que 
inviolabiliter debeant observari.  
Salvo, expresso et declarato, quod per predicta vel aliquod predictorum non intelligatur aliquid esse 
provisum vel factum nec aliquid provideri vel fieri possit quod creditoribus dicti communis in 
quorum favorem fuerunt hactenus deputate seu assignate alique quantitates pecuniarum seu ipsis 
adsignamentis124 vel deputationibus aliquod preiudicium generari vel aliqualiter derogari. Non 
obstantibus in predictis vel aliquo predictorum aliquibus legibus, statutis, ordinamentis, 
provisionibus aut reformationibus consiliorum populi et communis Florentie, aut obstaculis vel 
repugnantiis quibuscumque etiam contra quantumcunque derogatoriis, penalibus vel precisis vel 
etiam si de eis vel ipsorum aliquo debuisset vel deberet fieri spectialis mentio vel expressa. Quibus 
omnibus intelligatur esse et sit nominatim, expresse specialiter et generaliter derogatum. Et sic per 
opportuna consilia populi et communis Florentie firmatum fuit ac reformatum et obtemptum anno 
domini MCCCL.... 
Et quod postea per dictum offitium sedecim civium florentinorum habentium baliam, ut dictum est, 
fuit inpositum et inductum Iacobo filio Arrigucci condam Locti de Pegoloctis populi Sancte Felicitatis 
de Florentia, quod ipse deberet mutuare communi Florentie de prestanzia florenorum auri 
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 quinquaginta milium facta civibus florentinis certam florenorum auri quantitatem, scilicet centum 
florenos auri, in vexillo Schalarum quarterii Sancti Spiritus civitatis Florentie.  
Et modo pro parte dicti Jacobi filii dicti Arrigucci, dicatur ipsum Iacobum non teneri nec posse 
gravari ad dictum mutuum faciendum, pro eo et ex eo, quia in anno Domini MCCCXLIII0 per 
commune Florentie, et solempne et opportuna consilia populi et communis Florentie, causis et 
rationibus in suprascriptis provisione et reformatione privilegio et immunitate contentis fuit facta 
et firmata infrascripta provisio et reformatio in favorem dicti Arrigucci et eius filiorum et 
descendenitium per lineam masculinam, et eisdem fuit concessa et data immunitas et privilegium a 
dicto commune Florentie infrascripte continentie et tenoris in effectu, videlicet:  
In Dei nomine, amen. Anno sue salutifere incarnationis MCCCXLIII0, indictione XII, die XXIIII0 
mensis februarii. In consilio domini capitanei et populi florentini, mandato nobilis et potentis militis 
domini Rainaldi domini Baligiani de Cumis de Staffulo populi et communis Florentie honorabilis 
capitanei et defensoris artis et artificum civitatis Florentie, precona convocatione125 campaneque 
sonitu in palatio populi florentini more solito congregato; et die XXVI eiusdem mensis februarii in 
consilio domini potestatis et communis Florentie, mandato magnifici et potentis militis domini 
Johannis Marchionis montis Sancte Marie civitatis et communis Florentie honorabilis potestatis, 
precona convocatione campaneque sonitu in dicto palatio populi florentini more solito congregato. 
Et per ipsa iam dicta consilia, ut supra dicitur, congregata presente, volente et consentiente dominis 
prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie populi et communis Florentie totaliter approbata, adceptata 
et admissa et firmata fuit provisio infrascripta per predictos dominos priores artium et vexilliferum 
iustitie et officium duodecim bonorum virorum, cum diligenti examinatione et deliberatione eorum 
officii auctoritate et vigore super infrascriptis in ea contentis editis et factis et infra, proxime et 
immediate adnotata et scripta. Et quod in hiis et super hiis procedatur et fiat et observetur in 
omnibus et per omnia prout et secundum quod infra, proxime et immediate plenius et latius legitur 
et habetur, cuius quidem provisionis tenor talis est: 
Cum infrascripta petitio predictis dominis prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie exibita et porrecta 
fuerit in hanc formam. Coram vobis dominis prioribus artium et vexillifero iustitie populi et 
communis Florentie, exponit et dicit Arrighuccius condam Locti de Pegoloctis populi Sancte 
Felicitatis de Florentia pro126 se eiusque filiis et descendentibus maschulis per lineam maschulinam, 
quod quando fuit concordia inter magnificos et potentes dominos dominos Albertum et Mastinum 
della Schala de civitate et pro civitate Lucana ex una parte, et commune Florentie ex altera, actum 
fuit in dicta concordia licet verbis tantum; et promissum dictis dominis paciscentibus pro dictis 
Arriguccio eiusque descendentibus supradictis, quod ipse Arriguccius et ipsi descendentes predicti 
essent et esse deberent perpetuo liberi et immunes ab omnibus et singulis libris, impositis et 
factionibus et honeribus, quibuscunque tam realibus quam personalibus atque mixtis tam127  
presentibus, preteritis et futuris; et quod decetero ipsi et eorum bona propterea gravari et 
inquietari vel molestari non deberent vel possent aliqua ratione vel causa. Quare supplicatur vobis 
quatenus placeat vobis per vos et officium duodecim bonorum virorum et per opportuna consilia 
populi et communis Florentie deliberare et deliberari facere, quod ipse Arriguccius eiusque filii et 
descendentes per lineam maschulinam predictam non possint de cetero gravari vel molestari in 
iudicio vel extra de iure vel de facto, nec etiam inquietari pro aliquibus libris, impositis, prestantiis 
vel factionibus vel quibuscunque oneribus128, realibus vel personalibus vel mixtis, tam presentibus, 
preteritis quam futuris, vel ipsorum bona presentia vel futura, aliqua ratione vel causa per 
commune Florentie eiusque officiales presentes et futuros.  
Non obstantibus aliquibus statutis, ordinamentis, legibus seu iuribus editis vel edendis in 
contrarium facientibus quoquo modo. Unde predicti domini priores artium et vexillifer iustitie, 
considerantes amorem sincerum quem semper dictus Arriguccius habuit et habet ad populum et 
commune Florentie, et quod quando facta fuit et inita concordia inter dictos dominos Albertinum et 
Mastinum et commune Florentie continuo laboravit et sua opera disposuit in favorem et 
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 commodum dicti populi et communis. Et obsides qui detinebantur in civitate Verone honoravit, et 
agevolari fecit et facit et alia multa fecit pro ipsius populi et communis honore conservandum 
propter que dignum et iuxtum est quod ipsum commune Florentie, ipsum Arriguccium 
prosequatur gratia et honore, ut bene faciendi ceteris cedat in exemplum, habita super hiis pluries 
consilio et deliberatione cum gonfaloneriis societatum populi florentini et officio duodecim bonorum 
virorum. Et demum inter dictos dominos priores artium et vexilliferum iustitie et dictum officium 
duodecim bonorum virorum secundum formam statutorum, premisso129 facto et obtempto partito 
et secreto scruptineo ad fabas nigras et albas eorum officii auctoritate et vigore et omni modo et 
iure quibus melius potuerant, providerunt, ordinaverunt et stantiaverunt quod ipse Arriguccius 
eiusque filii et descendentes per lineam masculinam vigore et auctoritate presentis provisionis sint 
et esse debeant et intelligantur in futurum et pro futuro tempore liberi et immunes ab omnibus et 
singulis libris, prestantiis, factionibus et oneribus quibuscunque communis Florentie realibus vel 
personalibus vel mixtis, que in futurum et pro futuro tempore imponerentur vel indicerentur, 
excepto quam a gabellis communis Florentie; et quod per aliquod regimen vel offitialem populi et 
communis Florentie ipse Arriguccius vel eius filii et descendentes per lineam maschulinam, vel 
eorum bona occasionibus predictis vel aliqua earum, non possint vel debeant compelli vel cogi, 
excepto quam pro gabellis, ut dictum est, sub pena librarum quingentarum florenorum parvorum 
cuilibet contrafacienti, et predicta non servanti et quotiens auferenda et communi Florentie 
applicanda. Non obstantantibus aliquibus statutis, ordinamentis legibus vel iuribus editis vel 
edendis in contrarium facientibus quoquo modo. 
Et ex adverso pro parte communis Florentie predicte dicatur et dicitur quod predictus Iacobus 
tenetur mutuare et solvere dicto communi dictum mutuum et quantitatem pecuniarum, actenta et 
considerata balia et potestate dictis dominis sedecim attributa per dicta consilia populi et communis 
Florentie et derogata in ipsa balia apposita. Et predicti domini sedecim offitiales de predictis et 
super predicto puncto dubitantes, nolentes posse de iniustitia redargui, set volentes unumquemque 
in suo iure quatenus in eis est conservare, predictam questionem de iure consulendam 
commiserunt in sapentes viros — 
dominum Francischum domini Locti 
dominum Niccolam Lapi 
dominum Loysium de Iamfigliazzis 
dominum Baldum de Perusio et 
dominum Francischum domini Bici de Aretio  
— cives florentinos, doctores et advocatos et iurisperitos. Quid iuris sit super predictis, visis dictis 
privilegio et immunitate concessis dictis Arriguccio et filiis et balia et potestate concessis dictis 
dominis sedecim, de quibus supra fit mentio, et aliis iuribus, rationibus et instrumentis et actis 
facientis ad predicta130?  
Et quod non possit dictus Iacobus gravari de predictis, videtur posse dici rationibus infrascriptis:  
(1) Considero primo131, quod hic potestas conceditur illis, qui alias non habebant ius imponendi. Ideo 
quantumcumque imponendi facultas concedatur per verba generalia et etiam importantia132 
libertatis arbitrii, tamen intelligitur secundum ius, ut 1. Si quando, in principio, de inoffi. te. (C. 3. 
28. 35), no. Ia. de Arena in 1. 1, § Omnis133, de operis novi nuntiatione (D. 39. 1. 1. 4)134. Item, a 
generalitate sermonis iniusta135 semper videntur excepta, ut 1. Qui servum mihi136, et 1. Quidam 
cum filiam, de verborum obligationibus137 (D. 45. 1. 96 et 132), l. Si cui, de servi. (D. 8. 1. 9), 1. 
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 Quamquam in arbitrio, ff. de ritu nuptiarum138 (D. 23. 2. 62). Ergo non videtur concessum quod 
illum139 gravent qui potest140 exceptione legiptima se tueri.  
(2) Item, in verbis generalibus semper subauditur habilitas, 1. prima, de sacroscanctis ecclesiis (C. 
1. 2. 1), 1. Ut gradatim, § Etsi141 lege (D. 50. 4. 11. 1). Unde cum dicitur “omnibus quibus volent,” 
intelligo de habilibus collectari et qui iusto privilegio non excusentur142.  
(3) Item, licet per verbum, “volent” videantur exempti ab observantia iuris, hoc est verum illius 
iuris quod est rudis equitas, que non sit ad iuris preceptum redacta143, 1. iii, in fine, de pa. po. (C. 8. 
46[47]. 3), 1. Creditor, § Lucius, ff. man. (D. 17. 1. 60. 4). Sic loquitur 1. Utrum, § Cum quidam, ff. 
de re. du. (D. 34. 5. 7[8]. 1), et probatur in 1. Thais144 ancilla, § Sorore, de fideycommissariis liber. 
(D. 40. 5. 41. 4), faciunt145 no. per Gui. de Cu.146, ff. de auro147 , 1. fi. (D. 34. 2. 40), ubi de hoc148.  
(4) Item, verba generalia non comprehendunt casus de quibus149 debet fieri mentio spetialis, ut ff. 
de mino.150, 1. Illud, § Si talis domino151 (D. 4. 4. 25. 1), et 1. Pomponius152 in prin., de procur. (D. 3. 
3. 40 pr.) cum ibi no. Set de hoc privilegio debuit fieri mentio specialis, quia clausulam habet 
derogatoriam, et quia ista dispositio totum ius illius absorberet153. Unde debuit dici, non obstante 
isto privilegio seu lege hoc concedente, 1. Quotiens, de preci. impe.(C. 1. 19. 2).  
(5) Item, dictiones universales154 non destruunt exceptiones singulares neque referuntur ad ea, de 
quibus est in specie provisum, 1. Coheredi, § Qui patrem155, de vulga. et pu. (D. 28. 6. 41. 5). 
(6) Item, si imperator confirmat omnia privilegia, non intelligitur156 confirmare iniusta157, no. Cy., C. 
de bonis que lib., 1. Cum opportet (C. 6. 61. 6)158. 
(7) Hec omnia tendunt inferre quod generalitas verborum non comprehendit casum quem non 
doceat comprehendi, set debet concessum159 a principe privilegium esse mansurum. 
(8) Item, ex generalitate sermonis non videtur esse160 dispensatio cum personis inhabilibus, nec 
videtur a dispensatione161 iuris et a tramite communis162, ut volunt omnia predicta iura. 
(9) Item, verba generalia iuris non sunt captanda, id est, per occasionem non sunt ad iniquitatem 
trahenda, 1. pe.163, ff. ad exiben.164 (D. 10. 4. 19), 1. Famosi, ad l. Iul. maie. (D. 48. 4. 7).  
(10) Item, per verba generalia iuste defensiones nunquam cuique165 videntur velle auferri, set 
frivole166 defensiones et subterfugia, l. Ita pudor (C. 9. 9. 27. [28]), et ibi de hoc in Glo. et per Cy.167 , 
C. de adul.168, ff. quod vi aut clam, 1. 1, § 1 (D. 43. 24. 1. 1). 
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 (11) Ad idem arguitur ex condictione personarum istorum officialium, quia cum sint commissarii et 
mandatarii, non videtur eis adtributa potestas revocandi beneficium domini datum benemerito, 1. 
Si hominem169, ff. mandati (D. 17. 1. 30).  
(12) Item, revocare concessum est inconstantia, sed constantia et perseverantia voluntatis incepte 
presumitur, nisi ostendatur mutata, sed non ostenditur sufficienter mutata, cum verba possint 
recipere congruum intellectum absque hoc. Unde non probat hoc esse et cetera, quia verba 
generalia non operantur adversus presumptionem iuris vel nature170, 1. Set et si quis, § Quesitum 
(D. 2. 11. 4. 4), 1. Obligatione generali, de pignor. (D. 21. 1. 6), et 1. Qui filios (C. 8. 16[17]. 6), cum 
sy.  
(13) Item, certissimum quod commune voluit conferre beneficium, set quod auferre voluerit sumus 
incerti, quia generalitas parit obscuritatem, ut. 1. Pretor edixit, § Si mihi plures (D. 47. 10. 7. 5). Set 
ubi ex una parte est certitudo171, ex alia ambiguitas, certitudini172 inherendum est. 
(14) Item, verba generalia, maxime clausularum usitarum adponi non tollunt recursum iuri, 1. fi., § 
pe., de condictione inde. (C. 4. 5. 11. 1), et ibi bonus textus et restringuntur ad ea que sunt 
secundum ius, 1173. Quero, § Inter locatorem, ff. lo. (D. 19. 2. 54. 1), et 1. Quidam cum filium174, de 
verb. ob. (D. 45. 1. 32). 
(15) Preterea175, legis latorem ita extimandum est legem condere176, ut neminem in singulari suo 
iure ledat, et ledi dicitur, qui commodum perdit, quod percipiebat ex publico tamquam privatus177, 
l. II, § Merito, et § Si quis a principe, ff. ne quid in loco publico (Dig. 43. 8. 2. 10 et 16), qui textus 
bene faciunt. Unde dicendum videtur quod illa sermonis generalitas interpetranda sit contra 
concedentem et contra leges generales, que178 impedirent huiusmodi actus fieri ob commune 
commodum, quia modo communitas statuit. Unde contra se ampliatio voluntatis sue debet accipi, 
non contra ius private persone, ut 1. Beneficium (D. 1. 4. 3) cum sua materia. Unde cum dicit “non 
obstantibus quibuscunque obstaculis”, intelligo procedentibus ex179 legibus generalibus commune 
commodum respecientibus; et convenit hec interpetratio etiam equitati, quia debet180 ut cuiusque 
rei sequantur incommoda, que commoda prosequuntur. 
(16) Preterea, istud beneficium videtur irrevocabile, quia indultum est ob meritum et eaque sic 
indulgentur, licet per modum qui alias solet generaliter vel causaliter esse revocabilis. Non est 
hoc181 casu revocabile, quia excedit terminum182 benefitii et adcedit negotio gesto., 1. Aquilius 
Regulus (D. 39. 5. 27). Ita183 videtur velle, 1. Quod semel ordo (D. 50. 9. 5). 
(17) Item184, beneficium istud, cum sit ad liberandum, transit in contractum absque partis 
presentia, et maxime quia factum ad petitionem Arriguccii allegantis hoc fuisse promissum. Unde 
vendicat ut debitum et ita ei fuit185 indultum. Et sic modo bene facit, 1. Aquilius Regulus, quia non 
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 videtur ex liberalitate tantum, set ex debito fieri. Ergo non potest dici mera lex, set lex habens 
effectum contractus, quia lex fit nullo iuris cogente, ut 1. Digna vox (C. 1. 14. 4). 
(18) Item, de duorum consensu processit et sic in vi pacti, quia ad petitionem Arriguccii. Et si 
dicatur tempore concessionis186 erat absens, dico quod non est verum, quia scripturam iudicat eum 
esse presentem et petentem. Item, quasi magistratus interrogavit et ex eius187  facto queritur 
absens. Unde non est proprie lex, habet tamen mixtum effectum quia quo ad eum cui conceditur 
est contractus, quo ad alios est preceptum et sic est lex quo ad eos. Sic C. de do. inter virum et 
uxorem, 1. pe. (C. 5. 16. 26). 
(19) Et ad predicta bene facit C. de silentiariis, 1. Decurionibus, libro XII188 (C. 12. 16. 3), et quod ibi 
in prima glosa dicitur189, et Andreas190 de Barulo ibi scribit quod per generalem191 legem non 
derogatur privilegiis specialiter indultis192. 
(20) Cum queratur utrum per predictam potestatem et baliam concessam dicto officio sedecim 
predicti, concedentes videantur voluisse adimere dictum privilegium dicto Arriguccio et filiis ex 
causa concessum et non per ambitionem vel obreptionem193 impetratum, videtur primo quod sic:  
(21) Primo194, quia istis dominis sapientibus est data195 in hoc in omnibus et per omnia tanta 
auctoritas quantum habet totus populus, ut patet in § “et pro predictis ibi ac si facta fuissent per 
populum, et cetera,” set per populum posset hoc fieri, ergo et cetera. 
(22) Preterea, ordinamentum, ex quo196 isti habent197  auctoritatem, habet clausulam derogatoriam 
generalem et spetialem quo ad mentem et verba. Cessat ergo questio voluntatis, quia per198 verba 
constat de mente, ut ff. de suppell.199, 1. Labeo, § Nec mirum (D. 33. 10. 7. 1), et in200 § Cum in 
verbis (D. 32. 1. 30. 2). Item, tantum operatur si lex dicit quod vult haberi casus singulares pro 
enumeratis quantum201 si singulariter enumerasset, ut C. de prescriptione XXX. annorum, 1. 
Omnes (C. 7. 39. 4). Item, hic sunt excepti casus penales pene ecclesie Romane commictende. Ergo 
in reliquis stat regula firma, quia in non exceptis, exceptio regulam roborat202 et confirmat. Item, 
immunitas hic203 non videtur ad extraordinaria munera, scilicet204 supra in dicta referenda, ut no. 
Dy. de le. primo, 1. Si ex toto (D. 30. 1. 8)205. Et sic intentio dominorum dupliciter adversari 
videtur: primo, in origine concessionis; secundo, in derogatione immunitatis.  
(23) E econtra206 videtur quod intentio dominorum non fuerit velle derogari immunitati, de qua 
queritur ad presens. Primo, propter precedentem pollicitationem. Secundo, propter debitam 
remunerationem. Tertio, propter adsurditatis et iniurie evitationem. Quarto, propter verborum 
restrictivam interpetrationem.  
(24) Ex primo, scilicet207 propter precedentem pollicitationem, arguo sic:  
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 (25) Ista immunitas fuit impetrata a communi sub certa causa pollicitationis, scilicet facte208 
dominis de Schala209. Et ex quo ista causa non fuit per concedentes reprobata, licet non expresse 
adsumpta compatiens se tamen cum adsumpta, videtur in concessione immunitatis tacite 
adprobata, ut ff. de suspec. tu., 1. Hae210 enim (D. 26. 10. 4), ff. de penis, l. Si preses (D. 48. 19. 32), 
C. de diversis rescriptis, l.i. (C. 1. 23. 1) et quod no., de except. rei iu., 1. Si <quis>211 ad exibendum 
(D. 44. 2. 18) et ff. de infamia, l. II, § Ignomine (D. 3. 2. 2. 2). Tunc sive dicamus quod fuerit 
simplex212 pollicitatio alteri213 altero facta verbis in absentem directis obligat in via Dei naturaliter, 
ut no. in questione VII, Quotiens cordis oculus214 (C.1 q.7 c.9). Sive dicamus pactum verbis in 
presente recipientis pro absente directis obligatur naturaliter et in via iuris scripti, ut in § Quin215 
ymmo (D. 2. 14. 7. 5). Ymmo videtur quod efficacius, nam pactum principis, id est, populi florentini 
in sua provincia principantis, est legis auxilio vestitum, ut C. de do. inter virum, 1. penultima216 (C. 
5. 16. 26); ergo et cetera, ut ff. de pactis, 1. Legitima (D. 2. 14. 6). Ridiculum est enim dubitare de 
eo quod princeps facit, ff. de constitutionibus prin. 1. I. (D. 1. 4. 1), et in 1. fi., ff.217 ad legem Iuliam 
pecul.218 (D. 48. 13. 16[14]). Set naturale vinculum non est verisimile legis conditorem in se nolle 
servare, cum aliis iubeat adimplere, ut219 ff. de legibus, 1. Princeps (D. 1. 3. 31), C. de legibus, 1. 
Digna vox (C. 1. 14. 4) et ibi per Cy.220, ff. de le. III, 1. Ex imperfecto (D. 32. 1. 23), cum rei publice 
turbetur status, si iuris publici observantia defecisset, ut ff. de orig. iuris, 1. II, § Et cum placuisset 
(D. 1. 2. 2. 24), versiculo, “initium <fuisse> secessionis”, et cetera, quod non intenderunt221 
statutentes directe vel indirecte, ut patet in proemiali parte ordinamenti prefati.  
(26) Ex secundo, scilicet propter debitam remunerationem222, arguo sic: 
(27) Privilegium istud non emanavit ex mera liberalitate, immo ob causam preteritam et 
presentem. Unde magis debet censeri remunerationis223 actus quam mere liberalitatis224 impensio, 
ut ff. de don.225 1. Aquilius, et 1. Si pater (D. 39. 5. 27 et 34), et iuvari debuit Arriguccius benefitiis 
impensis226 et non decipi, ut ff. commo., 1. In commodato, § Sicut (D. 13. 6. 17. 3), ff. de dolo, 1. Si 
cum mihi (D. 4. 3. 34), de prescriptis verbis, l. Naturalis227, § Quod si faciam (D. 19. 5. 5. 3). 
(28) Ex tertio, scilicet propter adsurditatis et iniurie evitationem, arguo sic:  
(29) Primo228, quia absurdum est ministrum facere quod non est verisimile dominum229 facturum, 
ff. man., 1. Si hominem, et 1. Creditor, § Lucius in Greco230 (D. 17. 1. 30 et 60. 4). Set non est 
verisimile quod populus florentinus, unde iura in florentina provincia oriuntur, iniuriam 
intullisset231 Arriguccio retractando absque causa quod dederat eidem merenti. Est enim hec iniuria 
                                                 
208 facta B 
209 dela Scella B 
210 hoc B V  
211 Si <quis> om. B 
212 simples B 
213 pro post alteri add. B 
214 Quotiens cordis oculus om. B 
215 quid B 
216 ut 1. penultima, C. de dona. inter virum et uxorem tr. B  
217 C. V  
218 in ff. ad legem Iuliam pecul., l. f. tr. B 
219 ut. om. B 
220 Cynus ad C. 1. 14. 4, cit., Vol. 1, ff. 25v-26r. 
221 intenderent B 
222 reverentiam B 
223 remuneratio B 
224 voluntate B 
225 ap q post don. del. V  
226 benefitio impenso B  
227 Naturale V  
228 primum B 
229 non esset dominus B 
230 in Greco om. B 
231 intullissent B 
 magna, ut ff. de aqua cotidiana232, 1.i, § Permictitur (D. 43. 20. 1. 41), ergo et cetera, ut C. unde vi, 
1. Meminerint (C. 8. 4. 6) 
(30) Ex quarto, scilicet233 propter verborum interpetrativam restrictionem, arguo sic: 
(31) Privilegio spetiali concesso persone cum causa per provisionem posteriorem, etiam habentem 
clausulam derogatoriam sub generalibus verbis, nisi specifice ac individue ad privilegium, de quo 
queritur descendat, non derogatur. Ymmo per privilegium tamquam per exceptionem generalis 
provisio restringitur234, ut ff. de le. II, 1. Legatorum, § fi. (D. 31. 1. 33. 1), et ar. in235 1. Alimenta, § 
Basilica , et 1. Stichus nutricis, de ali. vel236 cib. lega. (D. 34. 1. 16. 2; 1. 16. 20), et de vulg. substitut., 
1. Coheredi, § Qui patrem237 (D. 28. 6. 41. 5), et est expressum in c. Si propter tua, de rescriptis, lib. 
VIo (VI 1. 3. 10). Ut dicamus quod sic species derogat generi, sic individuum speciei238 summendo 
speciem dialectice239 pro genere subalterno legistarum. Ad hoc facit quod notat Dy. in 1. Si quis, in 
prin. testamenti, de le. III (Dig. 31. 1. 81)240. Nam hoc privilegium habet clausulam derogatoriam, 
et de ea241 non est facta specifica mentio, ergo et cetera.  
(32) Pro hoc facit quia exigere ab Arriguccio vel posteris eius242 videtur indebite, cum iam sit 
remissum et mandatum ad indebitum non extenditur. Nec quo ad exigendum, ut ff. de condict. 
indebi., 1. Si procurator243 (D. 12. 6. 6), ut244 hic; nec quo ad solvendum, ut ff. de solut., 1. Si <is>245, 
cui, § Flavius (D. 46. 3. 94. 3).  
(33) Item, faciunt ad predicta quedam rationes Guilielmi quas ponit in principio ff. veteris, in 
questione246 de donatione facta per Constantinum Beato Silvestro247, et quod notat Cy. in dicta 1. 
Digna vox.  
(34) Item, facit pro Arriguccio et filiis eius, quia donatio quam confert pater in filium in potestate 
est revocabilis. Tamen si confert in eo benemerito, non est sic revocabilis248, ut no., C.249, de inoffi. 
te., l. Unde <et> si parens (C. 3. 28. 6 in c.), C. de collat., 1. Si donatione (C. 6. 20. 13), et a similibus. 
Sic potest dici in privilegio, ut ius revocabile, efficiatur quasi inrevocabile, quando precedunt merita 
et cause obligatiorie250, ut hic.  
(35) Non obstat quod habent eamdem potestatem isti sapientes quam populus, quia verum est in 
commisis251, set istud non venit in commissione, ut in252 dicto § Lucius, ubi hic modus solvendi 
probatur in textu.  
(36) Item, non obstat si dicatur, ergo clausula derogatoria sic precisa que est in arbitrio eis dato 
nichil operabitur, quia ymo operatur253, quia tollit254 leges contrarias generales quo ad omnes et 
omnia, et speciales255 quo ad casus256, generales quo ad personas. Item, tollit privilegia iuris 
                                                 
232 coti. et exti. B 
233 scilicet B 
234 restriguit B 
235 in om. B 
236 et B V  
237 1. Coheredi, § Qui patrem, de vulg. et pup.tr. B 
238 dicamus - speciei om. B 
239 dialetice V  
240 Dynus ad D. 31. 1. 81. 
241 eo B  
242 quod post eius add. B 
243 l. Si procurator: l. f. B 
244 ergo B 
245 hiis B; om. V   
246 in questione om. B 
247 Prohemium lecturae super Digesto Veteri Guillelmi de Cunio , ed. B. Brandi, in Notizie intorno a Guillelmus de 
Cunio, le sue opere e il suo insegnamento a Tolosa, Rome 1892, Appendix II, pp. 106-0 7 . 
248 Tamen - revocabilis om. V  
249 Cy. V  
250 allegatorie B 
251 commissione B 
252 in om. B 
253 operatur ex operabitur corr. V  
254 tollit ex tollis corr. V  
255 et post speciales add. B 
 communis, ut si quis vellet se excusare, eo quod ius commune det ei immunitatem. Set non tollit 
privilegium ipsius statuti257, quia non videtur concedens factum suum in dubio258 revocare, ut ff. de 
condic. et de.259, l Non260 ad ea (D. 35. 1. 89). 
(37) Item, credo quod forte operetur etiam in privilegiis ambitiosis261 et absque causa obligatoria 
qualis est hec262, que deducta in forma contractus caderet sub263 causa obligatoria: “facio”, scilicet, 
“ut eximas”264. Si qua ergo per ambitionem extorta reperientur, ista possent per istos sapientes 
cassari, quia non habent causam subsistendi, ut dicta 1. Ambitiosa, de decretis ab ordine 
faciendis265 (D. 50. 9. 4), et in 1. Set reprobari, de excu. tu.266 (D. 27. 1. 6. 6 in c.), et est simile267  in 
clausula, appellatione remota, que est derogatoria appellationibus. Non tamen removet iustas 
appellationes, set268 frivolas, extra, de appellationibus, c. Ut debitus (X 2. 28. 59), cum sy.  
(38) Et hec vera intelligo269, nisi domini conditores legis aliter interpetrarentur suam270 legem, 
quod possunt, ut l. Ex facto de vulg. et pu.271 (D. 28. 6. 43), quia eius est interpetrari cuius et 
condere, C. de legibus. 1. fi. (D. 1. 3. 41), et ff. de reg. iur., l. Verum272 (D. 50. 17. 31), ubi etiam273 
dicit quod principis est extimare quem modum274 benefitii sui esse velit.  
(39) Quod dicta generalis275 commissio, facta dicto offitio sedicim et ipsorum provisio, non habeat 
tollere privilegium et immunitatem dicti Arrigucci276 et filiorum apparet rationibus infrascriptis:  
(40) Quia generalis dispositio non refertur ad spetialiter provisa, ut ff., de penis, 1. Sanctio legum 
(D. 48. 19. 41), de ver. obli., 1. Doli clausula (D. 45. 1. 119), et lib. VIo277, de regulis iuris, c. Generi 
(VI 5. 13. 34)278. 
(41) Quia generalis potestas intelligitur sine alterius lesione concedi, ff. ne quit in loco pu. fi., 1. II, § 
Si quis a principe (D. 43. 8. 2), C.279 de emancipat., 1. Nec avus (C. 8. 48[49]. 4), extra, de ecclesiis. 
edi. vel280 re., c.ii281 (X 3. 48. 2), et de rescriptis, c. Quamvis, lib. VIo (VI 1. 3. 8).  
(42) Quia in generali concessione non veniunt ea que quis spetialiter concessurus non esset, ff. de 
pignor. 1 Obligatione (D. 20. 1. 6), C. que res pi. obli. possunt, 1. Alumpnos282 (C. 8. 16[17]. 1), extra, 
de iureiurando, c. Veniens (X 2. 24. 16), de offit. vic., c. fi., lib. VIo283 (VI 1. 13. 3). Set non est 
verisimile quod consilia voluerint auferre per eos concessa maxime iuxta causa.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
256 et post casus add. B 
257 statuentis B 
258 factum suum post in dubio tr. B 
259 indebite B V  
260 Nam B 
261 admitiosis B 
262 hic B 
263 hic post sub del. V  
264 facias B 
265 de - faciendis om. B.  
266 1. Sed reprobari post et de excu. tu. tr. B.  
267 et simile est B  
268 iniustas post set add. B; p. post set del. V   
269 scilicet post intelligo del. V no. de immunitatibus in marg . sin. B  
270 sua V  
271 ut - pu. om. V  
272 et ff. - Verum om. B  
273 etiam om. B 
274 amodo 
275 quod autem generalis B 
276 privilegium immunitatis ipsius Arrigucci 
277 Extra V  
278 et - Generi om. B 
279 extra post C. del. B 
280 et V  
281 extra - ii om. B 
282 Amplius B 
283 de offit. VIo om. B 
 (43) Quia concessa per decuriones ex causa, sine causa tolli non possunt, ff. de decretis ab ordine 
faciendis, 1. Quod semel284 (D. 50. 9. 5) . Set dicti consiliarii285 sunt hodie loco decurionum, ut no. C. 
de decur., l. I286, lib. XIo (C. 11. 14[13]. 2), et ff. de senat. in rubrica (D. 1. 9) per Odo.287 Ergo hii 
consiliarii, qui dederunt dictam potestatem, non potuerunt eorum factum et decretum tollere quod 
primo fecerant causa non subsistente, que non subsistit. 
(44) Quia facta habentia clausulam derogatoriam tolli non intelliguntur, nisi specialiter illius fiat 
mentio, ut ff. de le. III, 1. Si quis in principio testamenti (D. 32. 1. 22), et no. ibi288 per Dy.289, et lib. 
VIo290, de regulis iuris, c. Quod semel placuit291, (VI 13. 21) et de le. I, 1. Si michi et tibi, § In 
legatis292 (D. 30. 1. 12. 3).  
(45) Quia ius alterius non potest tolli sine causa, quia nec imperator potest, ut no. in constitut., ff. in 
principio (D. 1. 4. 1) per Glo.293 et doctores, et 1.II. de preci. imperat. offe., C. (C. 1. 19. 2). 
(46) Quia rescripta contra ius elicita294 non valent etiam ab imperatore, nisi causa iusta295 
intercedat, ut in auct. Ut nulli iud., § Hoc vero iubemus (N. 134. = Auth. 9. 9. 6), et 1. Rescripta, C. 
de preci. imperat. offe. (Cod. 1. 19. 7), et 1. fi., si contra ius utilitatemve296 publi. (C. 1. 22. 6), et 
quod in eis no. per Odo. et Cy.297  
(47) Quia in generali ordinatione solutionis semper subauditur de iure debentes, ut 1. Omnes, C. 
sine censu vel reliq. fundum298 (C. 4. 47. 3), 1. I, ff. de eo299 quod certo loco (D. 13. 4. 1), 1. Ut 
gradatim, § Etsi lege, ff. de mun. et ho. (D. 50. 4. 11. 1).  
(48) Quia rescriptum ius alterius auferens debet fieri ex certa scientia et de scientia constare, ut 1. 
II, de rescriptis, C. (C. 1. 23. 2), et quod ibi notatur300. 
(49) Quia non debet quis301 contra factum302 suum venire, et cetera, ut C. ne. fi. rem quam. ve. 
evin. (C. 10. 5. 1 et 2), et303 1. Post mortem, de adopt. (Dig. 1. 7. 25). 
(50) Quia statutum factum ad privatam utilitatem respiciens tolli non potest, ut per Gandinum in 
rubrica, de statutis, in ultima questione, et sic no. in questione statututorum II. cart.304  
(51) Facit ad predictam305, dictum Host. expresse306 in summa, de privil., § ultimo, in versi. IIIo et 
IIIIo in et alii sequentes307, ubi expresse tenet quod privilegium ex causa concessum revocari non 
potest, et quod revocans in penam incidit308.  
                                                 
284 1. Quod semel post ff. de decretis ab ordine faciendis tr. B 
285 consilia B 
286 II V  
287 per Odo. om. B Odofredus ad D. 1. 9 rub., Lectura super Digesto Veteri, Lyon 1552, f. 25va. 
288 et ibi no. et B 
289 Dynus ad D. 32. 1. 22. 
290 Extra B V  
291 plene V  
292 et de le. - legatis om B 
293 Glossa Quod principi placuit ad D. 1. 4. 1, p. 30.  
294 elicita B 
295 secunda iussa V  
296 ius vel uti V  
297 per Cy. et doc. B Odofredus ad C. 1. 22. 6, Omnes Cuiuscumque, ed. cit., fol. 49r, n. 3; Cynus ad Cod. 1. 22. 6, 
cit., Vol. 1, ff. 39v -40v.  
298 facit B V  
299 de eo om. B 
300 et - notatur: no V  
301 scilicet post quis del. B 
302 sum post factum del. B 
303 C. - et om. B 
304 ut - cart. om. B Albertus Gandinus, Quaestiones statutorum. ed. A. Solmi, in Biblioteca iuridica medii aevi, 
scripta anecdota glossatorum, Bologna 1892, Vol. 3, p. 168, rub. XXVII.  
305 Facit - predictam: Ad quod facit B 
306 expresse om. B  
307 Hostiensis, Summa aurea 5, 33 (De privi. et exces. privi.), Lyon 1537, f. 263rb, § 10.  
308 Sic tenet franciscus ac., spe. et odofre. in extravagantibus (B); Sic expresse tenet f. ac., in tit. de extravag., 
doctores, spec. ad officium iudicis maleficorum (V)post incidit add. 
 (52) Visis igitur309 dicta commissione facta dicto officio sedecim et balia et potestate eis concessis310, 
et visis dictis311 immunitate et privilegio concessis312 dictis Arriguccio et filiis, et visis maturis 
rationibus et iuribus313 supradictis314 et statutis et ordinamentis communis Florentie facientibus ad 
predicta; et omnibus que videnda et consideranda fuerunt315, consulunt infrascripti doctores, 
advocati et iurisperiti, quod generalis commissio facta dicto officio sedecim et verba derogatoria in 
ipsa commissione apposita non intelliguntur, nec intelligi debent, comprehendere immunitatem et 
privilegium predictum Arriguccio concessum. Et per hoc ipsum priv ilegium firmum remanet. Et 
ideo contra ipsum gravari316 non potest per dictos sedecim. Unde ad casum propositum, respondent 
quod ipse Arriguccius et dictus Jacobus eius filius non potest vel debet predictis occasionibus317 
gravari seu cogi ad solvendum dictam prestantiam, de qua supra dicitur.  
Ego Franciscus domini Locti de Salviatis utriusque iuris professor predictus, una cum predictis et 
infrascriptis doctoribus et advocatis et iurisperitis, consulo ut superius continetur. 
In nomine domini, amen. Ego Baldus de Perusio utriusque iuris doctor, actu legens in magnifica 
civitate Florentie ordinarie ius civile, dico et consulo ut superius continetur, deliberato primo dicto 
consilio cum predicto excellentissimo doctore domino Francisco et aliis superius nominatis et 
describendis inferius, quorum dicta et oppiniones sequor, ut dicta maiorum validis suffulta 
rationibus. Et ideo ad fidem me subscripsi propria manu et sigillum solitum mei nominis apposui, 
salvo consilio cuiuslibet melius sentientis. 
Ego Franciscus domini Bici de Aretio consulo iuris esse ut in supradicta conclusione concluditur, et 
ita puto esse iuris, salva sententia veriori, et ideo me subscripsi. 
Ego Niccolas Lapi iudex sentio iuris esse ut superius continetur.  
Ego Loysius de Gianfiglazziis legum doctor indignus auctoritatem suprascriptorum dominorum 
sequutus et rationes supra positas, ut supra consulo. Ideo me subscribo318.  
 
                                                 
309 Visa ergo B 
310 concessa B 
311 visa dicta B 
312 concessa B 
313 supra post iuribus del. V   
314 supradictis ex suprap corr. V   
315 consultus post fuerunt del. B 
316 veniri B 
317 ipse Arriguccius - occasionibus: ipse Arriguccius et filii non possunt vel debent dictis occaxionibus B 
318 Ego Franciscus domini Locti - subscribo: Ego Franciscus domini Locti de Salviatis utriusque iuris professor, 
una cum predictis et infrascriptis et cetera. Ego Baldus de Perusio. Ego Franciscus Becti de Aretio. Ego Nicola 
Lapy et cetera.  
